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1 Introduction
Democratic deliberative bodies, such as committees, councils, or legislative assemblies across
the world choose policies by means of voting. Members of an assembly can aﬀect the policy
outcome chosen by the assembly by coordinating their voting behavior and forming a voting
bloc. A voting bloc is a coalition with an internal rule that aggregates the preferences of its
members into a single position that the whole coalition then votes for, acting as a single unit
in the assembly. From factions at faculty meetings in an academic department, to alliances
of countries in international relations or political parties in legislative bodies, successful vot-
ing blocs influence policy outcomes to the advantage of their members. In national politics,
legislators face incentives to coalesce into strong political parties in which every member votes
according to the party line. Exercising party discipline to act as a voting bloc, strong parties
are more likely to attain the policy outcomes preferred by a majority of party members.
However, agents are not identical and the benefits of forming a voting bloc are not equally
shared by all. Some members of a voting bloc may prefer to leave the bloc, making it unstable.
Who benefits when agents with diverse preferences form a voting bloc? What makes a voting
bloc stable? What configuration of voting blocs do we expect to find in an assembly with
heterogeneous voters? These are some of the questions that I address in this paper, modeling
an assembly with a finite number of agents who can coordinate with each other to form voting
blocs before they vote to pass or reject a policy proposal.
My theory adds a novel insight about endogenous party formation. A group of members of
an assembly -a party- strategically coalesce into a voting bloc to coordinate their votes, seeking
to influence the policy outcome for an ideological gain. Party members commit to accept the
party discipline and to vote for the party line, which is chosen according to an aggregation rule
internal to the party.
In the first part of the paper I consider an assembly with two exogenously given parties, one
on each side of the political spectrum, and I analyze whether or not every member of a party
has an incentive to accept the party discipline depending on factors such as the types of the
agents, the polarization of the assembly, the sizes of the parties, the internal rule that a party
uses to aggregate the preferences of its members, and the process that leads to the formation
of a voting bloc.
I find that in each party there is one extreme party member who is the least likely to benefit
from the coordination of votes in her party, and this extreme agent determines whether or not
the party can form a stable voting bloc with a given internal aggregation rule. I show that for
some preference profiles a party cannot form a stable voting bloc that always imposes party
discipline upon its members, but it can form a stable voting bloc with laxer party discipline using
an internal voting rule that lets members vote freely when there is substantial disagreement
within the party. I also show that for some other preference profiles, a party cannot form a
stable voting bloc even though the formation of a bloc would benefit every member because
the party faces a collective-action problem: Each member individually benefits more by staying
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out of the bloc and letting others coordinate their vote, even though they all become better
oﬀ if they all commit to form a voting bloc. With respect to polarization of preferences, I
find that party discipline becomes increasingly diﬃcult to sustain as a stable outcome as the
parties become more extreme. In fact, a party of suﬃciently extreme agents can only form a
voting bloc if it uses a very permissive rule that lets members vote freely as soon as two of them
disagree with the party line.
Voting blocs are not only a consequence of political parties and their sophisticated partisan
strategies. Rather, the coordination of votes and the gains to be made by forming a voting
bloc are in itself a reason for the endogenous formation of parties. In the second part of the
paper I consider an assembly in which any subset of voters can coordinate and coalesce to form
a voting bloc. I show that given the configuration into blocs by the rest of the assembly, any
arbitrary coalition of agents who form a voting bloc attains a net gain in the sum of expected
utilities of its members. I analyze the endogenous formation of voting blocs in the assembly
and I seek voting bloc structures -partitions of the assembly into voting blocs- that are stable.
I show that there exist Nash stable voting bloc structures. In these structures, no agent has
an incentive to leave the bloc she belongs to and join some other bloc. I find that Nash stable
voting blocs must be of size less than minimal winning.
To obtain sharper predictions about the configuration of voting blocs, I apply the model
to a small assembly and I introduce a new “Split stable” concept that allows for coalitional
deviations in which at most one bloc splits. I show that in a stylized assembly with 9 members
whose types are symmetrically distributed, all Nash and Split stable voting bloc structures
have two voting blocs one at each side of the ideological spectrum and a group of independents
including the median in between the two blocs. In the last section of the paper I compare this
result with the predictions derived from empirical data on the voting patterns of the United
States Supreme Court from 1995 to 2004.
Using data on the 419 non-unanimous decisions that the Court reached in this period, I
provide estimates of the ideal position of each justice in one and two dimensional spaces and
I calculate how the formation of voting blocs would have changed the decisions of the Court.
For each hypothetical connected voting bloc structure I find the decisions that would have
been reversed due to the coordination of votes inside the blocs if this voting bloc structure had
formed. I assume that the justices that dissented (voted with the minority) on a decision would
have liked a reversal of the decision, and those who in the data voted with the majority and won
would have been worse oﬀ had the decision been reversed. Aggregating over all the decisions,
I calculate the net balance of beneficial minus detrimental reversals for each justice induced by
the given voting bloc structure, relative to the original data. Assuming that these individual
net balances of reversals are payoﬀs to the justices, I calculate which connected voting bloc
structures are stable if justices form voting blocs to maximize their payoﬀ. The only Nash and
Split stable connected partitions involve two voting blocs of size three: Three of the four liberal
justices (Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer) in a liberal bloc, and the three most conservative
justices, namely Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas in a conservative voting bloc. This empirical
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exercise shows that justices have strategic incentives to coalesce into voting blocs.
The theory of this paper draws inspiration from several literary subfields.
In the coalition formation literature, the seminal work of Buchanan and Tullock [8] analyzes
the costs and benefits of forming a coalition and praises the virtues of unanimity as internal
voting rule. Hart and Kurz [19] study the endogenous formation of economic coalitions under
the restriction that the overall partition of the society into coalitions is eﬃcient. Carraro [9]
surveys more recent non-cooperative theories of coalition formation, but mostly with economic
and not political applications. Traditional models of coalition formation assumed that agents
only care about by the coalition they belong to, not by the actions of other agents outside
their coalition. The newer partition function approach recognizes that agents are aﬀected by
the actions of outsiders, and it defines utilities as a function of the whole coalition structure
in the society. Bloch [7] and Yi [34] survey the literature on coalitions that generate positive
externalities to non-members, such as pollution-control agreements, and coalitions that create
negative externalities to non-members, such as custom unions. However, there is no literature on
the more general case in which a coalition generates both positive and negative externalities to
non-members. The formation of a voting bloc or a political party generates positive externalities
to those who agree with the policies endorsed by the party, and negative externalities to agents
with an opposed policy preference. My model provides intuitive results for the mixed or hybrid
case in which the formation of a voting bloc or party generates both positive and negative
externalities to non-members, in a simple framework where the outcome of a voting game
determines the payoﬀ to each agent.
In previous formal theories of party formation Snyder and Ting [32] describe parties as
informative labels that help voters to decide how to vote, Levy [22] stresses that parties act
as commitment devices to oﬀer a policy platform that no individual candidate could credibly
stand for, Morelli [25] notes that parties serve as coordination devices for like-minded voters to
avoid splitting their votes among several candidates of a similar inclination. All these theories
explain party formation as a result of the interaction between candidates and voters. Baron [6]
and Jackson and Moselle [20] note that members of a legislative body have incentives to form
parties within the legislature, irrespective of the interaction with the voters, to allocate the pork
available for distribution among only a subset of the legislators. My theory shows that legislators
also have an incentive to form parties -voting blocs- in the absence of a distributive dimension,
merely to influence the policy outcome over which they have an ideological preference.
From the applied American Politics literature, Cox and McCubbins [10] find that legislators
in the majority party in the US Congress use the party as means to control the agenda and
the committee assignments, and Aldrich [1] explains that US parties serve both to mobilize an
electorate in favor of a candidate, and to coordinate a durable majority to reach a stable policy
outcome avoiding the cycles created by shifting majorities. I complement their explanations
proving that voting blocs of size less than minimal winning also influence the outcome even if
they are not big enough to guarantee a majority, and they generate an ideological policy gain
to their members.
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Two recent papers in the political economy literature deal with the selection of the voting
rule for a single coalition: Barberá and Jackson [5] define self-selecting rules as those that would
not be beaten by any other rule if the given voting rule is used to choose among rules; Maggi
and Morelli [23] study self-enforcing rules such that agents would want to undertake collective
action under such rule. Finally, the voting power literature exemplified by the work of Gelman
[18] takes a diﬀerent approach on coalition formation and assumes that agents want to maximize
the probability of being pivotal in the decision, instead of maximizing the probability that the
outcome is favorable to their interests.
In the following sections I attempt to apply the game-theoretic insights of the coalition
formation literature to shed light on the political economy problem of coordinating the voting
behavior of the members of a coalition.
2 Motivating Examples
In this section I present three examples to illustrate how the formation of voting blocs aﬀects
voting results and policy outcomes. After a simplistic example that illustrates how voting blocs
work, I present a more complete example in which two stable voting blocs form in a small
assembly, and an application to a larger assembly.
Example 1 Suppose there is an assembly with five agents who have to take a binary choice
decision -to approve or reject some action- by simple majority. Suppose that the agents face
uncertainty about preferences, in particular, the probability that an agent i favors the action is
1
2 for each i, and these probabilities are independent across agents. The probability that at least
three agents favor the action and the action is approved is also 12 . The outcome coincides with
the preference of a given agent i if at least two other agents have the same preference as i. This
event occurs with probability 1116 .
Suppose three agents form a voting bloc, such that all three members vote according to the
preferences of a majority of members of the bloc -that is, if two members agree, the third votes
with them regardless of her own preference. Then the decision reached by the assembly depends
exclusively on the preferences of the members of the bloc. The probability that the outcome
coincides with the preference of a member i is equal to the probability that at least one other
member of the voting bloc has the same preference, which is 34 =
12
16 >
11
16 . Hence, the agents who
form a voting bloc increase the probability that the policy outcome coincides with their wishes.
The probability for non-members drops to 816 .
A bloc of three agents in Example 1 is stable in the minimal sense that no member wants to
leave the bloc. If a member leaves, the new situation with a bloc of size two is identical to the
original situation with no blocs, because a bloc of two agents is always ineﬀective: Either both
members agree and vote together as they would in the absence of a bloc, or if they disagree, no
side holds a majority so each agent is free to vote her true preference, just as if they were not
in a bloc.
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However, the bloc with three members is not stable if outsiders are free to join in. Indeed,
both outsiders want to join. If one or both of them join, the probability that any agent in the
assembly obtains her desired outcome becomes 1116 , which represent a loss for the three original
members of the bloc, but a gain to the entrant. The outsiders cannot achieve anything by
forming a new bloc of their own because the old bloc of size three is big enough to act as a
dictator in an assembly of size five. Some intuitions gained in this example generalize, as I shall
show below: Forming a voting bloc always generates a gain in aggregate utility to its members
(Proposition 8) relative to remaining independent, but if entry to the bloc is open to outsiders,
stable blocs cannot be too big relative to the size of the assembly (Proposition 13).
In Example 1, the agents are identical random voters, so that only the size of the bloc matter,
and not the characteristics of its members. In the rest of the paper I study heterogeneous agents,
some of whom are ex-ante more likely than others to favor the action or policy proposal that
is put to a vote.
We can interpret the uncertainty about preferences in two complementary ways. First,
suppose there is a time diﬀerence between the moment when agents coalesce in voting blocs,
and the time of voting in the assembly. Then, when the agents make the commitment to act
together they do not fully know which outcome they will prefer at the time of voting. Three
legislators may sign a pact today to vote together in votes to come in the future, but they
do not know today the agenda or the details of the policies they will vote on in the future.1
Alternatively, in a world of complete information in which agents vote repeatedly, a legislator
who votes for the liberal policy with a certain frequency x can be modeled as a legislator with
a probability x of voting for the liberal policy in a one-shot voting game.
The random voting model used in Example 1 and in the voting power literature2 is an
extreme case of uncertainty, when agents not only do not know exactly how they will feel about
future policy proposals, but they can’t even take a guess. In my paper, I assume that there is
some uncertainty about how agents vote, but that ex-ante it is possible to diﬀerentiate agents
according to their expected preferences. For instance, it is not a foregone conclusion that a
Republican legislator in the US Senate will vote in favor of future tax cuts and a Democratic
senator against them, but it is ex-ante more probable that the Republican, rather than the
Democrat, will favor the tax cuts.
The ex-ante diﬀerences in the preferences of the agents are key determinants of the strategic
incentives to form voting blocs. Let us see how a polarized small assembly splits into two
diﬀerent voting blocs, none of which is minimal winning.
Example 2 Suppose there is an assembly with seven agents who have to take a binary choice
decision -pass or reject some policy proposal- by simple majority. Suppose that agents have
1For instance, the countries of the European Union regularly discuss the notion of a common foreign policy.
If some day they sign a treaty establishing a binding common foreign policy, they will sign the treaty with
incomplete information about the foreign policy issues that will be salient after the treaty is ratified and comes
to eﬀect.
2Within this literature, see Felsenthal and Machover [17] for a study of voting blocs.
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uncertain preferences, so that each agent i favors the proposal with an independent probability
ti. Suppose t1 = t2 = t3 = 14 and t4 = t5 = t6 = t7 =
3
4 . Table 1 shows the probability
that the policy proposal gathers at least four votes and passes unconditional (column one) and
conditional on agent 7 favoring the policy proposal (column two), and the probabilities that
the outcome coincides with the preferences of agents 7 (column three), 4 (column four) and 1
(column five), given that the following voting blocs form: no blocs (row one); agents 5, 6, 7 form
a bloc (row two); agents 1, 2, 3 form a bloc (row three); both blocs form (row four); agents 1, 2, 3
form a bloc and 4, 5, 6, 7 form another bloc (row five). If a bloc forms, the whole bloc votes
according to the preference of the majority of its members, and in case of a tie, each member
votes according to her own preferences.
Bloc Pass Pass| 7 favors 7 satisfied 4 satisfied 1 satisfied
None 59.4% 68.8% 68.8% 68.8% 57.3%
{5,6,7} 75.7% 83.9% 75.3% 76.3% 41.9%
{1,2,3} 42.3% 51.2% 59.5% 59.5% 63.4%
{1,2,3},{5,6,7} 68.4% 74.7% 68.6% 85.4% 45.4%
{1,2,3},{4,5,6,7} 77.1% 86.6% 77.8% 77.8% 39.4%
Table 1: Probabilities that the proposal passes and that agents like the outcome.
The numbers on the table come from simple binomial calculations. Glancing at the table it
is evident that the formation of diﬀerent voting blocs has a significant eﬀect on the outcome.
Note that regardless of whether the three low types form a bloc or not, three high types are
better oﬀ forming a voting bloc if they take the actions of the other members as given, and
similarly, given that a bloc with three high types form, or given that it doesn’t form, the three
low types are better oﬀ forming their bloc. The outcome with two blocs of size three is Nash
stable -no member of a bloc wants to leave, no other agent wants to enter.
Note that agent 4 in Example 2, identical in all respects to agents 5, 6, 7 does not want to
join the bloc of high types. Rather, with two opposing blocs the remaining independent agent
is better oﬀ, since the two blocs are likely to counterbalance each other and the outcome is
then often left for the independent to decide. With only the purely ideological motivation of
caring for the policy outcome and no rents from oﬃce to distribute among the members of the
winning coalition, agent 4 has no incentive to join the bloc of high types, and blocs will not be
of minimal winning size.
The insights gained in the previous abstract two examples have important applications to
voting in committees, councils, assemblies, and, in particular, in legislatures where legislators
can coalesce into political parties that function as voting blocs. For ease of calculation and
exposition, the agents in the following example have very specific preference profiles; this is only
for illustration, and the body of the paper generalizes the intuitions provided in the example.
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Example 3 Consider an Upper House with 100 members in a bicameral system such that a
bill approved in the Lower House requires 51 favorable votes in the Upper House to become
Law, otherwise a status quo remains in place. Suppose that the Lower House is under liberal
control and always passes liberal bills, while legislators in the Upper House come in three types:
20 conservatives, 30 moderates and 50 liberals. Conservatives oppose every bill, liberals favor
every bill, and each moderate favors exactly one third of the bills, in such a way that exactly
one third of the moderates favor any given bill. Then, in the Upper House every bill has 60
supporters (10 moderates and 50 liberals) and 40 opponents (20 conservatives and 20 moderates)
and in the absence of voting blocs the advocates of the bill always win.
Suppose all 30 moderates and 10 conservatives in the Upper House form a voting bloc which
they call the Coalition, and they commit to always vote together by first meeting in a Coalition
Caucus and reaching a common position by simple majority in the caucus. For each bill that
comes to the Upper House, the Coalition Caucus gives the same outcome: 10− 30 against the
bill. Then, if all the members follow the dictates of the voting bloc they have just formed, in the
division of the Upper House none of them votes for the bill, each bill then receives only 50 votes
in the floor of the Upper House, all coming from liberal legislators, and the bill is defeated.
The formation of a voting bloc by a minority in Example 3 crucially aﬀects voting results,
policy outcomes, the utilities of the legislators involved and, ultimately, the utility of their
constituencies. Conservative legislators now always achieve their desired outcome (defeating
the bill). Moderate legislators achieve their desired policy in two out of three cases (those in
which they oppose the bill), which is twice as often as without a voting bloc. But the example
shows only the potential gains of forming a bloc, not the diﬃculties in making it stable to
safeguard these gains. The minoritarian Coalition dominates the Upper House in Example 3
because it manages to forge a voting bloc that quashes internal dissent and shows no fissures
in voting patterns.
The Coalition is not stable. Every moderate has an individual incentive to leave. Suppose
one moderate defects and becomes an independent. If the independent opposes the bill, the
defection has no eﬀect; the bill gathers only 50 votes and fails. But in the event that the
independent favors the bill, the bill passes 51 − 49. The independent is now pleased with the
outcome with certainty, thus she benefit from her defection to the detriment of those legislators
who remain in the Coalition.
The probabilities over events in this example are contrived to make calculations trivial, but
two important intuitions generalize.
First, note that while every moderate has an incentive to abandon the Coalition, the con-
servatives gain nothing by leaving. In Proposition 2 below I show that given a voting bloc that
leans towards one side of the political spectrum, it is only the most moderate members of the
bloc who threaten the stability of the bloc; if the moderate members benefit from participat-
ing in the bloc, it follows that the extreme members also benefit from participating. In other
words, it is only the liberal wing of a conservative party, and the conservative wing of a liberal
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party who determine whether the party can form a stable voting bloc. Intuitively, if the most
left-leaning legislator in the US House of Representatives introduces a bill to her liking, the
hope that it passes must lie in gaining the favorable vote of Democrats, as it is implausible that
a progressive liberal bill could pass against the opposition of Democrats by gathering enough
Republican votes. If a majority of Democrats opposes the bill, the bill is doomed anyway, so
the legislator has nothing to gain in terms of policy outcomes by defecting from the Democratic
Party.
Second, suppose that the Coalition Caucus changes its rules and adopts the following su-
permajority internal voting rule: Members have freedom to vote in the Upper House according
to their own wishes unless three quarters of the members of the Coalition share the same view,
in which case the whole Coalition must vote together. In a bloc of either 39 or 40 members this
rule requires that at least 30 members share the same opinion before the minority is forced to
vote with the majority. If all moderates stay in the Coalition they always achieve the threshold
and the bloc functions equally as if it was using simple majority: Thirty members oppose the
bill, so the whole Coalition votes against it and the bill fails with just 50 liberal votes. Now
consider the incentives of a moderate given the new rule. As a member of the bloc, the legislator
attains the outcome she wants whenever she opposes the bill, which occurs with probability
two thirds. Suppose she leaves the bloc and she opposes the bill. Then there are only 29 legis-
lators left opposing the bill inside the bloc, not enough according to the new rule to force the
minority of dissenters to reverse their vote. Hence 10 moderates vote for the bill, and the bill
passes 60− 40. The deviant is now worse oﬀ as an independent, because her vote is necessary
for the Coalition to act together as a voting bloc, and as a result the Coalition with the new
supermajority rule becomes stable.
This result generalizes, as shown in Proposition 5: Under weak conditions on the size of the
parties that compose the assembly, and for any size of the assembly, there exist type profiles
such that a party cannot form a stable voting bloc if it chooses simple majority as its internal
voting rule, but it can form a stable voting bloc with some supermajority internal voting rule.
The first preliminary insight into the gains reaped by voting blocs is the following: Whenever
the bloc changes the outcome by casting all its votes according to the preferences of its internal
majority instead of splitting its vote according to the preferences of all its members, it benefits
a majority of members and hurts only a minority, thus producing a net gain for the bloc as a
whole.
The second basic insight is that generating a gain is not suﬃcient for the bloc to be stable
-or to form in the first place. Rather, it must be that every agent has a strategic incentive to
participate in the bloc. The rest of the paper explores the individual incentives to participate
in blocs, and the resulting stability properties of diﬀerent voting bloc formations as a function
of the preferences of the members of the assembly and of the voting rules used by the voting
blocs.
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3 The Model
Let N ={1, 2, ..., N} be an assembly of voters, where N ≥ 7 is finite and odd. This assembly
must take a binary decision on whether to adopt or reject a policy proposal pitted against a
status quo. The division of the assembly is a partition of the assembly into two sets: The set of
agents who vote in favor of the proposal, and the set of agents who vote against the proposal.
The assembly makes a decision by simple majority and the policy proposal passes if at least
N+1
2 agents vote in favor.
A voter i ∈ N receives utility one if the policy outcome coincides with her preference in
favor or against the proposal and zero otherwise, hence there is no intensity of preferences.
Let si = 1 if agent i prefers the proposal to pass, and zero otherwise; let s = (s1, ...sN ) be
a preference profile for the whole set of voters, and let s−i = (s1, ..., si−1, si+1, ..., sN) be the
profile without the preference of i. Similarly, let vi = 1 if agent i votes in favor of the proposal
in the division of the assembly, and vi = 0 otherwise.
Agents face uncertainty at the initial stage. They do not know the profile of preferences in
favor or against the proposal. They only know, for each profile of preferences s ∈ S = {0, 1}N ,
the probability that s will occur. Let Ω : {0, 1}N −→ [0, 1] be the probability distribution
over profiles and assume Ω is common knowledge. Let ti be the type of agent i, which is the
probability that i favors the policy proposal, so ti = P [si = 1]. If these probabilities are not
correlated across agents, then I say that types are independent.
Definition 1 Types are independent if Ω(s) =
Q
i∈N
[tisi + (1− ti)(1− si)] for all s ∈ S.
If types are independent the probability that i favors the policy proposal is ti for any given
realization of preferences by the rest of agents, that is, P [si = 1|s−i] = ti for all i ∈ N and all
s−i ∈ S−i = {0, 1}N−1.
Let the assembly be composed of two exogenously given coalitions L and R, which I call
“parties” and a set M of independent agents who belong to neither of the two parties, so
N =L ∪ R ∪M . Let NL, NR and NM be the respective sizes of L, R and M and assume for
simplicity that all three sizes are odd. This setting applies to a legislature such as the US House
of Representatives or the US Senate in which legislators aﬃliate to one of the two dominant
political parties, or remain independent. Each of the two parties C = L,R can coordinate the
voting behavior of its members by forming a voting bloc VC = (C, rC) with an internal voting
rule rC that maps the preferences of its members into votes cast by the bloc in the division of
the assembly. Then it becomes a strong party that exhibits party discipline in voting. I assume
that joining a voting bloc is voluntary, so the party as a whole forms a voting bloc only if every
member wants to participate in it, otherwise only a coalition of agents representing the subset
of party members who want to participate form a voting bloc, and the rest of party members
do not coordinate their votes, eﬀectively becoming independents. Independent agents who are
not originally aﬃliated to a party do not coordinate their votes.
The timing of events is as follows.
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Given an arbitrary pair of internal voting rules rL and rR, each member in party L simulta-
neously chooses whether to join the voting bloc with rule rL or remain outside the bloc to act
independently, and similarly each member in R chooses whether to join the voting bloc with
rule rR or not. Two voting blocs thus form, each bloc containing the members of a party who
choose to join it. Then a preference profile s is realized, each agent i learns her own preference
si, and the two voting blocs hold their internal meetings. Finally the whole assembly meets
and agents vote according to the outcome of their voting bloc’s internal meeting if they have
joined any, or according to their own wishes otherwise.
Given a coalition C of size NC that forms a voting bloc, in their internal meeting the
members of C determine their coordinated voting behavior according to their own internal
rule rC , where rC = rL if C ⊆ L and rC = rR if C ⊆ R and I assume that the voting bloc
has commitment mechanisms such that the outcome of this internal meeting is binding. In
particular:
1. If
P
i∈C
si ≥ rCNC , then
P
i∈C
vi = NC . If the fraction of C members who prefer the policy
proposal is at least rC , then the whole bloc votes for the proposal in the division of the assembly.
2. If
P
i∈C
si ≤ (1− rC)NC , then
P
i∈C
vi = 0. If the fraction of C members who are against the
policy proposal is at least rC , then the whole bloc votes against the proposal in the division of
the assembly.
3. If (1 − rC)NC <
P
i∈C
si < rCNC , then
P
i∈C
vi =
P
i∈C
si. If neither side gains a suﬃcient
majority within the voting bloc, each member votes according to her own preference in the
division of the assembly.
I assume that rL and rR are such that the thresholds rLNL and rRNR are integers weakly
larger than NL+12 and
NR+1
2 respectively. With an rC − majority internal rule, the integer
rCNC is the number of votes the majority in the voting bloc (C, rC) must gather in order to
roll the internal minority and act as a unitary player in the division of the assembly, casting
all NC votes in favor of the policy advocated by the majority of the bloc. A rule rC =
NC+1
2NC
is simple majority, and rC = 1 is unanimity, which is identical to not coordinating any votes
-members only vote together if they all share the same preference.
Members of a voting bloc reveal their private preference by voting in the internal meeting
of the bloc. Since there are only two alternatives, and the rules of both blocs and the assembly
are such that the probability that each alternative wins is increasing in the number of votes
it receives, sincere voting is weakly dominant; voting against her preference can only make an
agent worse oﬀ. Therefore, it is safe to assume that members of a bloc reveal their preference
truthfully and then it is without ambiguity that I use the same notation for the true preference si
and the vote of agent i inside the bloc.3 In a more straightforward interpretation that bypasses
internal voting, a bloc learns the true preferences of its members and its aggregation rule maps
3To be formally precise, I would need to define a new variable bsi to denote the preference expressed by i in the
internal meeting of coalition C, and let
P
i∈C
bsi determine the outcome of the internal meeting, but since sincere
voting is weakly dominant, bsi = si for all i ∈ C, all C ⊆ N and all s ∈ S.
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the internal preferences into a number of votes to be cast in favor of the policy proposal in the
division of the assembly.
Since non-dominance alone results in sincere voting, the only remaining strategic consid-
eration in the model is about membership in a voting bloc. Participation in a voting bloc is
voluntary and members of a party choose to join their party’s voting bloc according to their own
individual incentives. Agents seek to maximize the ex-ante (before preferences are revealed)
probability that the policy outcome in the assembly coincides with their policy preference. They
only participate in a voting bloc if belonging to the bloc increases this ex-ante probability.
I seek to explain under what conditions a party can behave as a cohesive unit, forming
a stable voting bloc in which every member voluntarily participates. While the equilibrium
properties of the entry game I have described are interesting, I focus on the narrower question
of the stability of the party. Rather than searching for equilibria after the original parties break
up and subsets of these parties form voting blocs, I find under what conditions a party can
form a voting bloc imposing voting discipline upon its members and every member accepts the
party discipline so that the voting bloc is stable. The stability concept that I use is merely a
voluntary participation condition. Whoever belongs to a bloc must be weakly better oﬀ as a
member of the bloc than deviating to become an independent. If a single party member doesn’t
want to join the bloc given that every other member does, the party cannot form a stable voting
bloc with voluntary participation.
Definition 2 A voting bloc VC = (C, rC) is Individual-Exit stable if every member i ∈ C weakly
prefers to join the bloc than to become an independent and let the bloc (C\i, rC) form instead.
Members of a voting bloc must be weakly better oﬀ ex-ante, at the time they commit to
participate in the bloc, before they learn their own preferences. Once voting blocs form, I
assume that there are binding mechanisms so that ex-post the losing minority within a bloc
cannot renege from the commitment to vote with the bloc’s majority; that is, the outcome of
the internal meeting of the voting bloc is enforced.
This is a partial-equilibrium definition: For C = L,R, a voting bloc VC = (C, rC) is
Individual-Exit stable if it is a best response in the entry game for every agent in C to join the
voting bloc given that every other agent in C joins the bloc, and taking as given the outcome
of the formation process in the other party. Each party may then be Individual-Exit stable
conditional on the formation or not of a voting bloc in the other party. I study the stability
of the assembly as a whole at the end of the section, providing a more formal extension of
Definition 2 to encompass the incentives to deviate by all agents in multiple voting blocs. First,
I focus on the formation of a bloc by a given party as a best response to the strategies of the
other party.
To capture the insight that party membership is correlated with policy preferences, I assume
that party L leans left and tends to vote in the aggregate against the policy proposal, while party
R leans right and with high probability a majority of its members favor the policy proposal.
To make this informal statement more precise, I introduce some notation.
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Given the probability distribution Ω over preference profiles, for any C ⊆ N , let gC(x) be
the probability that
P
i∈C
si = x. For any i, h in C, let gC−i(x) be the probability that
P
k∈C\i
sk = x
and let gC−ih(x) be the probability that
P
k∈C\{i,h}
sk = x.
Definition 3 A set of agents C of odd size NC leans right if for any non-negative k
gC(
NC − 1
2
− k) ≤ gC(NC + 1
2
+ k).
C leans left if the inequality signs are reversed and is symmetric if the condition holds with
equality.
For a set of even size, the relevant inequalities are:
gC(
NC
2
− k) ≤ gC(NC
2
+ k) for any positive k.
Definition 3 is best interpreted as follows: A coalition C leans right if for any size of the
internal majority and minority within the coalition, it is at least as likely that the majority
favors the policy proposal than that the majority rejects the proposal. Similarly, if for any
majority-minority split of preferences it is more likely that the majority rejects the alternative,
then the coalition leans left.
Assuming that one party leans left, a second party leans right, and the set of independent
agents is symmetric, the following results show the necessary and suﬃcient condition on the
types of the members of a party for this party to be able to form a stable voting bloc, given
that the opposing party forms (or doesn’t form) its own bloc.
Lemma 1 Let N =L∪M ∪R. Suppose types are independent, L leans left and forms a voting
bloc (L, rL), M is symmetric and for any i ∈ R, R−i leans right. Let l ∈ R be such that tl ≤ ti
for all i ∈ R. Suppose R forms a voting bloc with an internal rule rR. If agent l prefers to
participate in the voting bloc (R, rR) than to become an independent, then every i in R prefers
to participate.
Lemma 1 provides an important insight: The stability of the voting bloc (R, rR) depends
only on the agent with the lowest type in R. The intuition is that if the most leftist member in
party R has an incentive to participate in a right-leaning voting bloc, then every other party
member has an even greater incentive to belong to the bloc. The left-most agent is the least
likely to benefit from the actions of the bloc and the most likely to be rolled to vote against
her wishes, hence if she doesn’t want to deviate, no one else will.
Lemma 1 and other results below assume that M is symmetric and L leans left and forms
a voting bloc (L, rL). This assumption can be weakened. First, since the result holds if rL is
unanimity, it implicitly holds as well if no voting bloc forms in L -since forming a voting bloc
with unanimity is identical to not forming a bloc. More generally, it suﬃces to assume that the
distribution of votes cast in the division of the assembly by the set of agents L∪M (those not
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in R) is such that given any size of the majority vote in L∪M, with probability at least 12 this
majority is against the proposal. Formally, it suﬃces that:
P [
X
i∈L∪M
vi =
NL +NM
2
− k] ≥ P [
X
i∈L∪M
vi =
NL +NM
2
+ k] for any positive k.
This condition is similar to L∪M leaning left, but it applies to the probability distribution
of actual votes cast in the division of the assembly after accounting for the coordination of votes
inside L, and not to the probability distribution over true preferences.
Lemma 1 shows that inside each party only one extreme agent matters to determine whether
the party can form a stable voting bloc. In particular, I next show that a party leaning right
can form a stable voting bloc if and only if its left-most agent is not too far to the left, or, in
other words, if the lowest type in the party is high enough.
Proposition 2 Let N =L∪M ∪R. Suppose that types are independent, L leans left and forms
a voting bloc (L, rL), M is symmetric and for any i ∈ R, R−i leans right. Let l ∈ R be such that
tl ≤ ti for all i ∈ R. Suppose R forms a voting bloc with an internal rule rR. The voting bloc
(R, rR) is Individual-Exit stable if and only if tl is higher than a cutoﬀ function tInR(rR, rL,t−l).
If the type of agent l is high enough, she wants to participate in the (R, rR) voting bloc;
if she wants to participate, every other member of R wants to participate and the bloc is
Individual-Exit stable. Intuitively, if R forms a voting bloc the main consequence is that with
a high probability most members of R favor the policy proposal, those who don’t are rolled and
compelled to vote in favor of it, and the policy proposal passes with a higher probability. An
agent l only wants to join such a bloc that essentially turns around nay-sayers to make them
support the policy proposal if l likes the proposal with a high enough probability. The cutoﬀ
is a function of the sizes of the blocs, the internal rules they use, and the types of all the other
agents in the society.
A symmetric result applies to the left party. Given that (R, rR) forms, the voting bloc
(L, rL) is stable only if the highest type th among the members of L is below a cutoﬀ function
tInL(rL, rR, t−h). Taking both results together, a corollary follows:
Corollary 3 Let N =L ∪M ∪ R. Suppose that types are independent, L−i leans left for all
i ∈ L, M is symmetric and R−j leans right for any j ∈ R. Let h ∈ L be such that th ≥ ti for
all i ∈ L and let l ∈ R be such that tl ≤ tj for all j ∈ R. Then it is a Nash equilibrium of the
entry game for every agent in L and R to respectively join (L, rL) and (R, rR) if and only if
th ≤ tInL(rR, rL,t−h) and tl ≥ tInR(rL, rR,t−l).
The two parties can each form a stable voting bloc if the highest type in the left bloc is
not too high, and the lowest type in the right bloc is not too low. Note that the types of the
members of each bloc may overlap, i.e. the right-most member of the Left bloc may be to the
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right of the left-most member of the Right bloc, but not too far to the right, and similarly
agents too far to the left will not belong to the Right bloc.
The exact threshold tInR(rR, rL, t−l) above which an agent with type tl wants to join the
voting bloc (R, rR) depends on the size and voting rule of the bloc (L, rL), the number of
independents and the type profile of all agents other than l in the assembly, all of which are
variables exogenous to R. But it also depends on party R, both on its size and the voting rule
it uses to aggregate preferences within its own bloc.
Simple majority, rC =
NC+1
2 , is the internal rule that maximizes the sum of utilities of the
members of a voting bloc VC = (C, rC). I show this in detail in the more general Proposition
8 below, but the intuition is as follows: A voting bloc only has an eﬀect in utilities if the
coordination of the voting behavior of its members alters the policy outcome in the division
of the assembly. A voting bloc subtracts votes from the position supported by its internal
minority, adding them to the internal majority position. Hence, if the bloc alters the outcome
in the assembly, it changes it from the outcome preferred by a minority of the members of the
bloc to the one preferred by a majority of members of the bloc. Since there is no intensity of
preferences, it follows that the sum of utilities in the bloc increases. Simple majority always
rolls the minority votes, so it maximizes the probability that the bloc alters the outcome in the
division of the assembly and gains a surplus, so it maximizes the sum of utilities of the bloc.
Notwithstanding the advantages of simple majority, for some parameters a bloc with simple
majority is not stable: Agents face a temptation to leave and “free-ride” from the coordination
of votes by the bloc. Other supermajority rC internal rules reduce the surplus gained by the
bloc, but in some instances make the bloc stable. I explore this possibility in the following two
results.
Proposition 4 Let N =L ∪M ∪R. Suppose types are independent and R is composed of NR
homogeneous agents with a common type tR. Then the voting bloc (R, rR) with rR =
NR−1
NR
is
Individual-Exit stable.
The voting bloc thus formed is stable regardless of the formation process of other voting
blocs or the types of other agents in the assembly. Indeed, irrespective of the other agents,
forming a bloc generates a surplus for its members, as discussed briefly above and proved
below for a more general case in Proposition 8. Identical members of a homogeneous bloc all
benefit from the surplus. Under a supermajority rule NR−1NR , if the bloc loses a single member,
it eﬀectively disbands, since with the reduced membership it would only reach the internal
threshold for a suﬃcient majority if all agents agree, in which case the bloc never aﬀects the
outcome and generates no surplus. For example, imagine a bloc with 7 members and a 6/7
rule, so that only minorities of one are rolled. If an agent deviates and leaves the bloc, the new
bloc with 6 members and a 6/7 rule is irrelevant: A majority of 5 to 1 does not represent a 6/7
majority, so the bloc never rolls its minorities. Thus, a stringent supermajority rule that makes
every agent essential to roll a minority deters exit -at least in a homogeneous bloc. The loss in
surplus is significant with such a stringent rule, since the bloc forsakes the opportunity to roll
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Figure 1: Individual-Exit stability of (R, rR) for rR ∈ {1/2, 2/3, 8/9}.
bigger minorities granted by simple majority. However, as shown in the next proposition, there
are some parameters for which a bloc with simple majority is not stable, and if a party wants
to form a stable bloc, it would need a more stringent internal voting rule.
Proposition 5 Let N =L ∪M ∪R. Suppose that types are independent with ti ∈ (0, 1) for all
i ∈ N\R. Suppose that L leans left and forms a voting bloc (L, rL), M is symmetric, NL ≤ N−12
and 3 < NR ≤ N+12 . There exists a vector of type profiles for the members of R such that R leans
right and (R, rR) is not Individual-Exit stable if rR is simple majority, but it is Individual-Exit
stable for some supermajority internal rule r0R.
Parties that cannot form a voting bloc with simple majority (because their members would
leave), can form a stable voting bloc that only coordinates the votes of its members when
the internal majority in the party is more substantial than a mere majority of one. Figure 1
illustrates this result. To be able to plot tInR(rR, rL, t−l) as a function of a single parameter, I
let NL = 11, NR = 9, NM = 31, ti = 0.3 for all i ∈ L,4 rL = 611 (simple majority), tm = 0.5 for
all m ∈M and th = tR for all h ∈ R\l. Given these values, I plot tInR(rR, rL, t−l) as a function
of tR for rR = 59 (simple majority), 2/3 and 8/9. It is clearly observed that the more stringent
the internal voting rule of R, the lower the type of l can be such that l wants to participate in
the voting bloc (R, rR).
While I do not study in this paper the endogenous selection of voting rules for a party, it
follows that the internal voting rule that maximizes the sum of utilities of the members of a
voting bloc among the class of r −majority rules, subject to the constraint that the voting
bloc be Individual-Exit stable is the lowest possible rule such that the bloc is stable. For some
parameters, this rule is a supermajority.
This result contrasts with the findings of Maggi and Morelli [23] who study a single coalition
that votes on whether or not to take a collective action. They find that the optimal self-
4The assumption that the L members have a common type 0.3 is arbitrary, and a very similar graph would
result for any vector of types in coalition L such that L will vote no with probability close to one.
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enforcing rule in an infinitely repeated game is always either the rule that maximizes the
social welfare if agents are patient enough, or unanimity if agents are impatient, and never an
intermediate rule. A key diﬀerence between this paper and theirs is that they restrict attention
to homogeneous agents (or in their terminology, “symmetric” agents) who all share the same
type. A second important diﬀerence is that in their model the collective action of the coalition
does not generate an externality to non-members. I show that once we take into account
that agents are heterogeneous and that the actions of a coalition generate externalities to
non-members, a supermajority rule that is not welfare-maximizing for the coalition sometimes
becomes the optimal internal rule given the constraint that agents cannot be forced to join
a voting bloc to participate in the collective action -in my case, the coordination of votes-
undertaken by the coalition.
This formal result is consistent with the “conditional party government” applied theory of
Rohde [29] and Aldrich and Rohde [2], who look at party discipline in the US Congress and
conclude that back-benchers delegate authority to their leaders to impose a party line only
when there is little disagreement within the party. In the words of Cox and McCubbins [10],
page 155:
The gist of conditional party government is that the party leadership is active
only when there is substantial agreement among the rank and file on policy goals. If
this hypothesis is true, one would expect that decreases in party homogeneity should
lead, not to decreases in support given to the leaders when they take a stand, but
rather to leaders taking fewer stands. This is essentially what we find.
Proposition 5 show that this finding is not an idiosyncrasy of the Democratic and Republican
parties in the US Congress, but rather, a general principle is at work: Party leaders find it easier
to make their party work as a disciplined voting bloc if they only enunciate a party line when
the minority of dissenters inside the party is small, and they let members vote freely whenever
the internal minority is large.
Next I study how the possibility that a party forms a stable voting bloc depends on the
extremism of the types of its members. I show that a suﬃciently extreme party cannot form
a stable voting bloc unless it uses the very restrictive almost-unanimity internal voting rule
considered in Proposition 4.
Proposition 6 Let N =L ∪M ∪R. Suppose types are independent, M is symmetric, R leans
right and forms a voting bloc (R, rR) and NL < NR + NM . Let (x1, ..., xNL) be an arbitrary
vector such that xi ∈ [0, 1] for all i = 1, ..., NL. Suppose the types (t1, ..., tNL) of the members of
L are of the form ti = αxi. If α is low enough, (L, rL) with rL ≤ NL−2NL is not Individual-Exit
stable.
A corollary to Proposition 6 is that no extreme party of size more than three but less than
minimal winning can form a voting bloc with simple majority, even if its members all share a
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common type. The intuition for this negative result on the stability of extreme parties is that
the preference of the internal majority is all but certain: In an extreme-left party, the majority
rejects the policy proposal with probability very close to one. In the -almost complete- absence
of uncertainty about the result of the internal vote, agents prefer to step out of the voting bloc
to avoid being rolled when they happen to favor the policy proposal. Only if rCNC = NC − 1
the result in Proposition 4 applies and a party of extremist is stable because if one of them
steps out of the bloc, the bloc dissolves and there is no possibility to enjoy the benefits of the
formation of the bloc while remaining out of it.
With simple majority as internal voting rule, the maximum size up to which a minority
voting bloc is stable is inversely related to the extremism of its members. I show this in a
numerical example, which tracks the maximum size of parties capable of forming stable voting
blocs as a function of the polarization of both a symmetric and an asymmetric assembly, split
into two homogeneous parties one at each side of the political spectrum and a number of
moderate independents in between.
Example 4 Let N =L ∪M ∪R. Suppose N = 101, types are independent, ti = 1/2 for every
agent i ∈ M, tj = tL for every member j ∈ L and tk = tR for every member k ∈ R. Columns
two and three of the following table show the maximum size of the two parties L,R such that
(L, rL) and (R, rR) are Individual-Exit stable with rC =
NC+1
2NC
for C = L,R, for a symmetric
assembly where NL = NR (column two) and an asymmetric assembly where NL = 2NR − 1
(column three), given the degrees of polarization specified in the diﬀerent rows.
(tL, tR) NL = NR NL = 2NR − 1
(0.45, 0.55) 31, 31 29, 15
(0.4, 0.6) 23, 23 25, 13
(0.3, 0.7) 13, 13 17, 9
(0.2, 0.8) 7, 7 9, 5
(0.1, 0.9) 3, 3 5, 3
The example illustrates the plausible intuition that extremists are only able to coordinate
in small numbers, while moderate agents can form larger voting blocs.
Sometimes a party cannot form a stable voting bloc because it faces a free-riding problem.
Every party member would be better oﬀ if the party forms a voting bloc, but some individual
party members benefit even more if the bloc is formed without them, so they have an incentive to
leave the party and let others coordinate their votes. To address this collective action problem,
suppose that a party does not allow a single member to step out of the bloc and free ride on the
advantages provided by the voting bloc, but rather, the party only forms a voting bloc if all of
its members participate. In other words, the party renounces to enforce any voting discipline
if a single member refuses to accept it.
If a party is able to commit to an “all or none” outcome in which either the whole party forms
a voting bloc or every party member votes independently, individual incentives to participate
change: Now an agent cannot leave the party and expect to reap the benefits from the rolling
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of minority votes inside the bloc while facing no risk of ever being forced to vote against her
own preference. In the new calculation each agent weighs the gain brought by the bloc, and
not the marginal advantage of being in or out of a bloc that forms. It follows that under
some circumstances, agents who would prefer not to participate in the bloc now choose to join
only because their participation becomes essential to the very existence of party discipline. By
committing to form a bloc only by unanimous agreement, a party can sometimes overcome the
collective action problem it faced under individual participation.
Given that the opposite party forms a voting bloc, suppose party C ∈ {L,R} plays the
following game GC : Every i ∈ C simultaneously chooses whether or not to sign a conditional
participation contract, by which i joins the voting bloc if and only if every other member in
C joins the bloc too. If every i ∈ C signs the contract, then the party forms the voting bloc
(C, rC), otherwise member of C do not coordinate their votes.
The players in the closed membership game GC are the NC members of party C. The set of
pure strategies of each player is binary: Sign or not sign. Payoﬀs for each agent are given by
the probabilities over policy outcomes determined by Ω and by the voting blocs resulting from
the game. The internal voting rule for the bloc is in this description exogenous, but it could
be incorporated into the strategy of the players, making the party form a bloc if and only if all
the members agree on a common rule, and those who do not want to participate can merely
propose unanimity, assuring that no bloc with a rule diﬀerent than unanimity can form. Let G
describe a larger game in which both parties choose simultaneously whether or not to form a
voting bloc by signing conditional contracts.
Results similar to Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 apply to the closed membership game GC
just described (these results are available from the author). If the type of the member with
the lowest type in party R is high enough then this member benefits from the formation of the
bloc (R, rR) and it is a weakly dominant strategy for her to commit to participate in the voting
bloc. If so, it is a weakly dominant strategy for every member to commit to participate.
Party C has something to gain by playing the game GC to form a voting bloc instead of
trying to form a bloc with whoever wants to join. For some parameters, by threatening not
to form a bloc if a single party member fails to join, in the equilibrium of the game GC party
C forms the voting bloc (C, rC) even though this bloc is not Individual-Exit stable if the bloc
does not dissolve after an individual deviation. Proposition 7 states this result formally.
Proposition 7 Let N =L ∪M ∪ R. Suppose that types are independent, M is symmetric, R
leans right and forms a voting bloc (R, rR) and NL < NM + NR. Then there exists a vector
of types (t1, ..., tNL) for the members of L for which the voting bloc (L, rL) with rL ≤ NL−2NL is
not Individual-Exit stable, but in the game GL it is a Nash equilibrium in weakly undominated
strategies for every i ∈ L to commit to participate in (L, rL).
In short, if the dissolution of the voting bloc follows the departure of a single party member,
then such departure -which would occur if the bloc did not react to the deviation and continued
functioning with a shrunk membership- is forestalled. This result extends to the game G in
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which both parties use conditional contracts to determine the formation of their respective
voting blocs: There exist vector of types for which, regardless of whether R forms or not a
voting bloc, party L cannot form an Individual-Exit stable voting bloc with rL ≤ NL−2NL , but
nevertheless in the Nash equilibrium of the game G every member of L commits to participate
in the voting bloc (L, rL). Conditional contracts to form a voting bloc only with unanimous
participation allow parties to solve the collective-action action problem that sometimes arises
when parties try form a voting bloc to coordinate the votes of their members.
I have studied the incentives of each of two parties to form a voting bloc. Proposition
2 shows the necessary and suﬃcient condition for a voting bloc with a majority rule to be
Individual-Exit stable. Propositions 5 and 7 propose two solutions that can help a party form
a voting bloc when a bloc with simple majority is not stable: Either to use a supermajority,
or to commit not to form the voting bloc unless every party member participates, if such a
commitment is possible.
In the following subsection, I generalize the model by weakening several assumptions and
allowing new voting blocs to form.
3.1 Generalization. Endogenous Voting Blocs
The model so far applies to an established assembly that uses simple majority as its voting rule
and has two well-defined parties. The results have shown under what conditions these parties
can form stable voting blocs that coordinate the votes of all their members.
Now imagine instead an assembly N where all agents are free to coalesce with whomever
they wish, with no pre-assigned cleavages or factions to restrict their coordination with any
other member of the assembly. The assembly uses a majority voting rule rN which may diﬀer
from simple majority, such that the (still exogenous) policy proposal passes if it gathers at least
rNN votes and a status quo stays in place otherwise.
The probability distribution over preference profiles is as before Ω, but types need not be
independent. Rather, the only restriction that I impose for some results below is that Ω has
full support, that is, Ω(s) > 0 for all s ∈ S = {0, 1}N .
Agents form voting blocs facing uncertainty over preferences, then they privately learn their
own preference, they vote internally in the voting bloc they belong to, and then they vote in
the assembly according to the outcome of their bloc or according to their own wish if they are
not members of any bloc.
I am interested in the problem of finding a configuration of the assembly into voting blocs
that is stable. Let C0 denote the subset of agents who remain independent and do not coordinate
their votes with any other agent. I treat this subset of agents as if they formed a voting bloc
with unanimity as its internal voting rule, so that they only vote together if they all agree.
Then, I refer to the configuration of agents into voting blocs in the assembly as the voting bloc
structure of the assembly.
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Definition 4 A voting bloc structure (π, r) is a pair composed of a partition of the assembly
π = {Cj}Jj=0 and a corresponding set of voting rules {rj}Jj=0 such that r0 = 1 and for j ∈
{1, ..., J}, Vj = (Cj , rj) is a voting bloc with internal rule rj .
Note that the voting bloc structure specifies both the membership of each voting bloc, and
the rule that each bloc uses to aggregate its internal preferences. I assume that for any voting
bloc VC = (C, rC), the rule rC is such that rCNC is an integer weakly larger than
NC+1
2 , where
NC is the size of coalition C.When I consider deviations from the voting bloc (C, rC), I assume
that rC doesn’t change following the defection of some members or the entry of a new member;
as a result, in the new voting bloc (C 0, rC) with size N 0C that follows the deviation it is possible
that rCN 0C is no longer an integer.
The voting bloc structure (π, r), together with the preference profile s determines the vote
of agent i in the division of the assembly, which I denote vi(π, r, s). Let ui(π, r) be the ex-ante
expected utility for agent i with the voting bloc structure (π, r).
An important result is that any coalition of agents attains a non-negative net change in
aggregate utilities if they form a voting bloc instead of remaining independent, regardless of
the configuration of the rest of the assembly.
Proposition 8 Given a voting bloc structure (π, r), suppose a subset C 0J+1 ⊂ C0 deviates and
forms a new voting bloc (C 0J+1, r
0
J+1). Denote the resulting voting bloc structure in which no
further deviations from (π, r) take place by (π0, r0). Then
P
i∈C0J+1
ui(π0, r0) ≥
P
i∈C0J+1
ui(π, r). A
simple majority internal voting rule r0J+1 maximizes the sum of utilities for the members of the
new voting bloc {C 0J+1, r0J+1}.
As discussed in the previous subsection, a voting bloc only has an eﬀect if it reverses
the policy outcome. If it does, it favors its internal majority at the expense of its internal
minority, generating a net gain. With simple majority the bloc always rolls its internal minority,
maximizing the probability that the bloc alters the outcome in the division of the assembly and
generates the mentioned net gain. Consequently, simple majority is the internal rule that
maximizes the sum of utilities of the members of the bloc, just as it is the rule for the assembly
that maximizes the utilitarian social welfare if all agents vote independently, as shown by Curtis
[11].
Not only the members of the new bloc benefit. Agents whose preference coincides with the
majority of the new bloc with high enough probability also benefit from the formation of the
bloc.
Individual utility maximizing agents, however, are not concerned with social welfare or the
eﬀect of a bloc on the rest of society. They are only concerned from the benefit they derive from
joining a voting bloc. Proposition 8 assures members of a bloc that collectively they benefit
from its formation, but if agents cannot make compensating transfers, a surplus for a coalition
does not guarantee a benefit to each of its members, and even if they all benefit, some agents
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may still have an incentive to leave and receive the benefits of the bloc as an externality without
bearing the costs. The main goal in this subsection is to find stable voting bloc structures in the
assembly when any arbitrary coalition of agents can form a voting bloc. I consider alternative
definitions of stability.
The first notion is the already familiar Individual-Exit stability, which only requires volun-
tary participation in voting blocs, so that each agent is free to leave and become an independent.
I now define the concept more rigorously for a voting bloc structure.
Definition 5 A voting bloc structure (π, r) is Individual-Exit stable if ui(π, r) ≥ ui(π0, r)
for any i ∈ N and any partition π0 = {C 0j}Jj=0 such that:
(i) l ∈ C 0j ⇐⇒ l ∈ Cj for all l ∈ N\i and all j ∈ {0, 1, ..., J}, and
(ii) i ∈ C 00.
Informally, a voting bloc structure is Individual-Exit stable if each of its voting blocs is itself
Individual-Exit stable. This stability concept is similar, but less restrictive than the Individual
Stability used by Drèze and Greenberg [13].
Definition 6 A voting bloc structure (π, r) is Individually stable if ui(π, r) ≥ ui(π0, r) for
any i ∈ N and any partition π0 = {C 0j}Jj=0 such that:
(i) l ∈ C 0j ⇐⇒ l ∈ Cj for all l ∈ N\i and all j ∈ {0, 1, ..., J}, and
(ii) for j ∈ {1, ..., J}, if i ∈ C 0j then ul(π0, r) ≥ ul(π, r) for all l ∈ C 0j .
Individual-Exit stability considers deviations only by departure from a bloc; Individual
Stability allows for entry if it benefits every member of the coalition that receives an entrant.
Entry is even more fluid under Nash stability; in a Nash stable voting bloc structure each agent
is free to leave its bloc to become an independent or to migrate to any other bloc. In a Nash
stable voting bloc structure every agent belongs to the bloc she likes most.
Definition 7 A voting bloc structure (π, r) is Nash stable if ui(π, r) ≥ ui(π0, r) for any i ∈ N
and any partition π0 = {C 0j}Jj=0 s.t. l ∈ C 0j ⇐⇒ l ∈ Cj for all l ∈ N\i and all j ∈ {0, 1, ..., J}.
It follows from the definitions that the set of voting bloc structures that are Nash stable
is contained in the set that are Individually Stable, which is itself contained in the set of
Individual-Exit stable voting bloc structures.
Once stable voting bloc structures are identified, it is important to know if they have any
eﬀect in the outcome. Taking the structure with no voting blocs in which all agents act as
independents as a benchmark, I analyze whether or not the formation of voting blocs aﬀects the
policy outcomes at least under some preference profile. If it never aﬀects the policy outcomes,
the coordination of voting behavior prompted by the voting blocs is irrelevant.
Definition 8 Let (π0, r0) be the voting bloc structure in which all agents remain independent.
A voting bloc structure (π, r) is relevant if with positive probability the policy outcome under
the structure (π, r) diﬀers from the outcome under (π0, r0).
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In short, if there is a relevant stable voting bloc structure, the coordination of voting behavior
inside the blocs aﬀects the policy outcome. It is possible to apply a similar definition to specific
voting blocs, rather than to the whole structure. A particular voting bloc (C, rC) is relevant
if the coordination of votes inside the bloc (C, rC) aﬀects the policy outcome with positive
probability. Formally:
Definition 9 Let (π, r) be a voting bloc structure with J blocs j = {0, 1, ...,bj, ..., J} such that
r0 = 1. Let (π, r0) be such that r0bj = 1 and r0j = rj for all j ∈ {0, ..., J}\bj. The voting bloc
Vbj = {Cbj , rbj} is relevant in the structure (π, r) if with positive probability the outcome under
the structure (π, r) diﬀers from the outcome under (π, r0).
The next two results show that there exist relevant stable voting bloc structures.
Proposition 9 Suppose Ω has full support and rN ≤ N−1N . Then there exists a relevant
Individual-Exit stable voting bloc structure. In particular, any structure with a single voting
bloc (C, rC) s.t. NC ≥ rNN + 1 and rCNC < rNN is relevant and Individual-Exit stable.
A voting bloc that is more than large enough to act as a dictator is Individual-Exit stable
because no agent gains anything by leaving a bloc that can still impose its will in the assembly
after the defection. Since the outcome of the internal meeting of the bloc determines the
outcome of the assembly, agents are better oﬀ participating in the internal meeting. The bloc
is relevant because it needs a lower number of favorable votes to adopt the policy proposal -and
impose it upon the assembly- than the threshold set by the voting rule of the whole assembly.
Proposition 10 Suppose Ω has full support and rN ≤ N−1N . Then there exists a relevant
Individually stable voting bloc structure. If rN ∈ (N+12N ,
N−1
N ], then a voting bloc structure with
a single bloc (C, rC) such that C = N and rC < rN is relevant and Individually stable.
If the grand coalition forms a voting bloc, there is no possibility of deviating by entering a
bloc. Hence the voting bloc structure is Individually stable -and Nash stable- if and only if it
is Individual-Exit stable. From Proposition 9, if the voting rule in the assembly is not simple
majority, then a voting bloc by the grand coalition with a lower internal voting rule is relevant
and Individual-Exit stable, hence it is Individually stable and Nash stable.
Corollary 11 Suppose Ω has full support and rN ∈ (N+12N ,
N−1
N ]. Then there exists a relevant
Nash stable voting bloc structure. In particular, a voting bloc structure with a single voting bloc
(C, rC) s.t. C = N , rC < rN is relevant and Nash stable.
If the voting rule of the assembly is simple majority, then Proposition 10 shows that a
relevant Individually stable voting bloc structure exists. In particular, a voting bloc structure
with a unique voting bloc (C, rC) such that NC = N−2 and rC is simple majority is relevant and
Individually stable. The bloc acts as a dictator and its members don’t want to leave and would
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not benefit by admitting any of the two non-members into the bloc. This particular voting bloc
structure is not Nash stable because the two non-members, who are essentially excluded from
the decision-making process, would enter the bloc is such a deviation was feasible for them. In
fact, for some probability distributions over preference profiles, there is no relevant Nash stable
structure. The next result shows existence of a Nash stable structure, and the following one
describes characteristics of relevant Nash stable structures, provided they exist.
Proposition 12 A Nash stable voting bloc structure exists.
The grand coalition C = N with rC ∈ [rN , 1] is irrelevant, but Nash stable. In a bloc
(N , rC) with rC ≥ rN , if the majority in the bloc had enough supporters to roll i, then it has
enough supporters to win in the division of the assembly, regardless of the rolled votes. Thus,
an agent cannot change the outcome by leaving, and the bloc is Nash stable.
Proposition 12 relates closely to Corollary 11: If the coalition of the whole forms a bloc
with a lower internal voting rule than the rule used in the division of the assembly, the voting
bloc is relevant. If it forms a bloc with a higher internal voting rule, it is irrelevant. In both
cases it is Nash stable, but in the first one it eﬀectively functions as if it endogenously changed
the voting rule of the assembly, and in the second case it merely makes some proposals pass (or
fail) with unanimity when they would have passed (or failed) just by majority.
If they exist, Nash stable voting blocs have to be of size smaller than minimal winning.
Proposition 13 Suppose Ω has full support and rN = N+12N . Then in any relevant Nash stable
voting bloc structure (π, r), NC < N+12 for any voting bloc {C, rC} with a simple majority
internal voting rule, and if there exist at least one singleton in (π, r), then NC < N+12 for any
relevant voting bloc {C, rC}.
Proposition 13 tells us that a relevant voting bloc cannot be large enough to act as a dictator.
If it is, every agent would like to join. To illustrate this result, think of the solid Democratic
South of the US during the first half of the 20th century. In an essentially one-party system, any
politician with some aspirations of furthering his ideal policies through the State legislatures
had a strong incentive to become a Democrat, irrespective of his political ideology. With no
barriers to enter blocs, competition among opposing blocs only occurs if the weaker blocs also
have a hope of influencing the policy outcomes.
A complete characterization of Nash stable voting bloc structures in full generality is an
overly ambitious task, since the solution varies with the size of the assembly and the probability
distribution over preference profiles of its members. Instead, in the following section I illustrate
the model at work applying the theory to a small assembly of size nine, using the empirical
data from the United States Supreme Court.
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4 A Small Assembly. The US Supreme Court
The theoretical model of endogenous voting blocs at the end of the previous section showed
that there exist stable partitions of an assembly into voting blocs, but besides predicting that
Nash stable voting blocs are of size less than minimal winning, it provided limited information
about the features of these stable voting bloc structures. In this section I seek a more detailed
description of the voting blocs that we expect to find in a small assembly. First I provide the
theoretical prediction in a stylized assembly of size nine and then I look at data from the United
States Supreme Court from 1995-2004.
4.1 Endogenous Voting Blocs in a Small Assembly
Consider an assembly with nine voters who have independent and symmetric types distributed
as follows: t1=t2=0.5-α-β; t3=t4=0.5-α; t5=0.5; t6=t7=0.5+α; t8=t9=0.5+α+β, with α, β ≥ 0
and α+ β ≤ 0.5.That is, types are symmetrically distributed around one half.
The parameters α and β have an intuitive interpretation: α measures the polarization of
preferences within the assembly. A hypothetical coalition of moderates comprising agents 3
through 7 (enough to become a majority centered around the median) spans an interval of
types of length 2α. The more polarized the members of the assembly are, the larger α and the
larger the diﬀerences in types that a coalition of moderates must accommodate in order to form
a voting bloc. The parameter β, albeit crudely, reflects the heterogeneity in types within each
side of the assembly, or in other words, the extremism of the left-most and right-most wings.
An intuitive conjecture is that intense polarization in the assembly would make a central
voting bloc unstable and would induce the formation of two opposing voting blocs, one on each
side of the median.
Proposition 12 on the existence of Nash stable voting bloc structures allowed for a multiplic-
ity of solutions under the most restrictive solution concept -Nash stability- that only considers
individual deviations. Indeed, several Nash stable voting bloc structures exist in the particular
assembly presented in this subsection.5
None of the solution concepts that I have studied so far allows members of a bloc to coor-
dinate a coalitional deviation. Hard as it may be for agents to communicate and coordinate
across blocs, it seems easier to scheme a deviation in which a subset of members in a bloc
defect together, and possibly form a new voting bloc. The following stability concept allows
for a coalitional deviation in which one bloc faces a split, a number (possibly zero) of its mem-
bers defect, and at the same time a (possibly empty) subset of the defectors and previously
independent agents form a new voting bloc.
Definition 10 A voting bloc structure (π, r) with J blocs is Split stable if there exists no
partition π0 = {C 0j}J+1j=0 , rule rJ+1 and coalition Cbj ∈ π such that:
5The complete Mathematica file with the results and figures in this subsection is available at
www.hss.caltech.edu/~jon, or by email directly from the author.
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(i) For all j ∈ {1, ..., J}, r0j = rj ,
(ii) for all j ∈ {1, ..., J}\bj and all i ∈ N , i ∈ C 0j ⇐⇒ i ∈ Cj ,
(iii) for all i ∈ N , i /∈ Cbj =⇒ i /∈ C 0bj ,
(iv) for any i ∈ N s.t. i ∈ C 00 and i /∈ C0, ui(π0, r ∪ rJ+1) ≥ ui(π, r) and for any i s.t.
i ∈ C 0J+1, ui(π0, r ∪ rJ+1) > ui(π, r).
Conditions (i) and (ii) say that all other blocs remain unaﬀected by the coalitional devi-
ation involving independent agents and members of bloc Vbj ; both the internal rules and the
membership of these blocs remain the same, and the internal rule rbj of the bloc Vbj is also kept
intact. Condition (iii) states that in the new partition the bloc that suﬀered the defection
gains no new members. Condition (iv) states that agents who defect become better oﬀ. When
agents are indiﬀerent between deviating or not, this fourth condition incorporates an intuitive
discrimination: Agents would abandon a bloc to become independents when indiﬀerent, but
they only deviate to a new bloc for a strict improvement. That is, agents break indiﬀerence as
if they had a lexicographic preference for independence.
The intuition for the Split notion of stability is that coalitional deviations across blocs
are harder to coordinate, perhaps because communication is limited across blocs, or because
diﬀerent blocs are antagonistic and suspicious of each other (i.e. Western and Soviet blocs
during the Cold War); whereas, a disaﬀected subset of a bloc can more easily break apart and
possibly recruit some independent agents for a new voting bloc. As an example, the moderate
wing of the UK’s Labour party broke oﬀ in 1981 and formed the Social Democratic Party, which
attracted up to 28 former Labour MPs.6
The notion that some members of a coalition may organize a coordinated defection even
though deviations across coalitions are not feasible is common to two previous concepts of equi-
librium in the non-cooperative coalition formation literature: The Coalition-Proof equilibrium
by Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston [4] and the Equilibrium Binding Agreements by Ray and
Vohra [27]. In these two concepts, agents negotiate as if each coalition was in a separate room,
and any group of agents in the same room could leave and find a new room for themselves, with
the important proviso that every deviation must itself be immune to further deviations (once
they deviants reach their new room, it must be that no subset of them would want to leave for
yet another room), so the definitions are recursive.
Split stability is diﬀerent first in that it is not a recursive concept, since I don’t require
a coalition of deviants to be immune to further deviations. Second, while I do not consider
deviations across coalitions, I allow deviants to coordinate with independents. Under Split
stability, agents negotiate as if each coalition was in its own room, but the independents were
all in a central lobby, so that when a set of deviants departs from a coalition they can recruit
any number of independents in their way to a new room.
Why use Split stability? First, although the requirement that deviations be themselves
6Admittedly, cross-party deviations are sometimes also successful, as illustrated by the new Kadima party in
the Israeli Knesset.
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immune to further deviations adds consistency to the Coalition-Proof and Equilibrium Binding
Agreements solution concepts and makes them theoretically more elegant, it also adds a layer
of unwelcome complexity. Allowing for best-response type of deviations makes Split stability a
much simpler concept to define and use in applications. Second, agents may prefer to proceed
with a deviation even if this deviation is itself unstable. If it is diﬃcult to predict the stream of
deviations that will follow an initial departure and agents cannot anticipate the ultimate out-
come propitiated by their deviation, a subset of agents displeased with the original configuration
may choose to deviate for a short-sighted gain even if subsequent deviations by other agents
could potentially undo the improvement brought by their first move. If so, Coalition-Proof and
Equilibrium Binding Agreements solutions will be unstable.
In this section I find the connected voting bloc structures in a nine agent assembly that are
relevant and Nash and Split Stable.
Definition 11 A voting bloc structure (π, r) is connected with respect to the order < if for
all C ∈ π and for all i, j, k ∈ N , (i, k ∈ C and i < j < k) implies j ∈ C.
Using numerical simulation for a fine grid of values of α and β, I find which connected
voting bloc structures are such that no agents would have an incentive to deviate to a diﬀerent
structure. The order of agents is according to their type, so a voting bloc is connected if its
members are in consecutive positions in the ordering by types. Axelrod [3] provides a detailed
argument in favor of connected coalitions over non-connected ones.
The intuition that in a very polarized assembly there won’t be a unique moderate bloc, but
rather, two blocs one in each side of the political spectrum is verified. There are only four
connected voting bloc structures that are Nash and Split stable. These are all such that exactly
two blocs L and R form with simple majority internal voting rules, each with three members,
and L ⊂ {1, 2, 3, 4}, R ⊂ {6, 7, 8, 9}. That is, three of the four members of the assembly with
a low type form a voting bloc, and three members with a high type form another bloc. It is
easy to visualize the L bloc as a pro-status quo party, which tends to vote against the policy
proposal, and the R bloc as a reform party, which tends to vote for the policy proposal.
Figure 2a,b,c shows in black the parameter values for which each voting bloc structure is
Nash and Split stable. For any α < 0.5, the voting bloc structure is relevant.
The three figures share the common characteristic that only for a high α the voting bloc
structure is stable. If the assembly is not polarized and agents share similar types, then each
agent in voting bloc L has an incentive to defect to R, eﬀectively disbanding L since no bloc
can function with only two members. If there is enough polarization, defections across blocs no
longer occur.
As a summary, this subsection has shown that if the assembly is suﬃciently polarized, there
is a stable and relevant connected voting bloc structure composed of two opposing blocs, located
one at each side of the median. In the rest of the section I depart from the stylized assumptions
of the modelled assembly (symmetry and independence of types), looking instead at real data
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Figure 2: a,b,c. Nash and Split stable voting bloc structures.
from the United States Supreme Court. After introducing the Court and the policy preferences
of its members, I calculate the eﬀect of voting blocs upon the outcome of the Court.
4.2 The United States Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court is the ultimate appellate court in the United States judicial
system, and the arbiter of the United States Constitution. It is composed of nine justices and
it uses a simple majority rule, so that the vote of five justices are enough to decide a case. The
Court makes a binary decision on the merits of each case: It either aﬃrms or reverses the ruling
of a lower court. In an accompanying Opinion, the Court provides the argumentation for its
decision, and this Opinion serves as precedent for future cases.
I use the data on the decisions of the Court from The United States Supreme Court Judicial
Database compiled by Spaeth [33] and I select all non-unanimous cases with written opinions
in which all nine justices participate.7 Spaeth codes the votes of each justice as zero or one
depending on whether the vote to aﬃrm or reverse the decision of the previous court is inter-
preted as more liberal or more conservative. An alternative binary coding of the votes which is
unambiguously objective divides the votes between votes with the majority, and dissents -votes
with the minority.
Table 2 shows the number of liberal votes and the number of dissents that each justice cast in
the 419 non-unanimous decisions recorded from 1995 and 2004. The nine justices, abbreviated
7The unit of analysis in my data is the case citation (ANALU=0), the type of decision (DEC_TYPE) equals
1 (orally argued cases with signed opinions), 6 (orally argued per curiam cases) or 7 (judgments of the court),
and I drop all unanimous cases and all cases in which less than 9 justices participate in the decision.
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by the first three letters of their surname, are: Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer, O’Connor,
Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas.
1.Ste 2.Gin 3.Sou 4.Bre 5.O’Co 6.Ken 7.Reh 8.Sca 9.Tho
Liberal 344 308 307 276 160 155 98 84 71
Dissent 203 159 136 141 71 78 115 161 156
Table 2: Liberal and dissenting votes in 419 decisions.
The most extreme justices, either liberal or conservative find themselves in the minority of
dissenters more often than the moderate justices. Justice O’Connor, traditionally regarded as
the swing justice, dissents in only about one in six cases, while Justice Stevens, who is the most
liberal member of the Court, dissents from the majority in roughly a half of the cases.
If justices formed voting blocs, the coordination of votes would change the voting record
of the justices, the composition of the majority and dissent justices in each case, the outcome
of some decisions, and, assuming that justices are policy-oriented, the utility or satisfaction of
the justices with the outcome of the Court. I calculate the changes brought by any possible
connected voting bloc structure in the Court.
The notion of a connected voting bloc requires an ordering of justices from one to nine. In
the tables and the text I of this section I use the ordering according to the number of liberal
votes cast as recorded by Spaeth [33]. I check if this ordering is robust by means of calculating
the ideal location of the justices in a space vector using three mathematical methods that
abstract from the substantive content of each case and attend only to the voting patterns and
correlations across the justices. Although my basic goal is to obtain an objective and robust
ordering of the justices, these analyses have an intrinsic value in that they provide estimates of
the location of each justice in a vector space with an easy interpretation in ideological terms
such as a liberal/conservative scale.
The three methods I use are: Singular Value Decomposition of the original data, Eigen
Decomposition of the square matrix of cross-products of the locations of the justices, and the
Optimal Classification method developed by Poole [26], and I compare these three estimates
with the findings of Martin and Quinn [24] and [21], who use Bayesian inference in a probabilistic
voting to estimate the ideal points of the justices. In Table 3 I provide the ideal position of the
justices estimated by Single Value Decomposition and Eigen Decomposition, the rank ordering
given by the Optimal Classification method in one dimension, the estimate of the position in
the first dimension given by the Optimal Classification method in two dimensions, and the
estimates obtained by Martin and Quinn. First I briefly explain each of the methods.
Mathematically, the Singular Value Decomposition of a rectangular matrix X419∗9 is
X419∗9 = U419∗419D419∗9V9∗9 s.t. UtU = I and VtV = I.
The matrix X contains the original data of zeroes (dissents) and ones (votes with the majority),
each case in a row and each justice in a column. This original data is decomposed into two
29
orthogonal matrixes and a diagonal matrix. The vectors in the square matrix V represent the
estimates of the ideal point of each justice in nine new dimensions, such that the estimates for
the first dimension represents the best fit to the original data with only one dimension; the
estimates for the second dimension are the best fit adding a second dimension but taking the
estimates for the first dimension as given, and the estimates for the k-th dimension are the best
fit in k dimensions taking the previous k − 1 dimensions as given. Here, “best fit” means the
approximation that minimizes the sum of the squared error between the approximation and
the original data. The “single values” along the diagonal of D are all positive and represent
the weights of each of the dimensions. See Eckart and Young [14] for the original mathematical
idea.
The Single Value Decomposition generates nine new coordinates capturing the most frequent
alignments of voting in the Court, and gives the location of each justice in all nine dimensions,
so that taking only the first one or two dimensions gives the best approximation of the location
of the justices in this reduced subspace.
The Eigen Decomposition and the Optimal Classification method require some previous
steps. First, I calculate the disagreement matrix, which is a 9 by 9 matrix that shows for each
pair of justices, the proportion of cases in which they do not vote together. Second, I convert
the disagreement score matrix into a matrix of squared distances, just by squaring each cell.
Third, I double-center the squared distances matrix by subtracting from each cell the row mean
and the column mean, adding the matrix mean, and dividing by (-2). Double centering the
squared distances matrix removes the squared terms and produces a cross-product matrix of
the legislator coordinates. For details of these steps, see Poole [26]. The Eigen Decomposition
of the cross-products matrix produces nine eigenvectors, which we can interpret as estimates
of the location of the justices in nine dimensions, and nine corresponding eigenvalues, which
assign weights to each of the dimensions. Mathematically, the Eigen Decomposition of a square
matrix X9∗9 is
X9∗9 = U9∗9 D9∗9 U
−1
9∗9,
where the elements of the diagonal are the eigenvalues, and the vectors of U the eigenvectors.
The Optimal Classification method in one dimension applied to the Supreme Court data
ranks justices from one to nine, and ranks each case in between a pair of justices, predicting
that all justices to one side will vote one way, and all justices on the other side will vote the
other way. For instance, if a case is ranked between 2 and 3, the OC method predicts that
justices 1 and 2 vote in the minority and the other seven justices in the majority. If in the real
data justice 3 also votes with 1 and 2, then that’s one classification error and the OC method
aims to minimize the number of these errors.
The algorithm used in the Optimal Classification method is as follows. Starting with the
rank ordering of the justices given by the first vector of the Eigen Decomposition of the double-
centered squared-distances matrix, assign a rank to every case in such a way that the ranks
minimize the total number of errors. Then, given the rank of every case, assign a new rank to
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the justices to minimize the number of errors given the ranking of cases. The algorithm proceeds
iteratively re-ranking cases given the ranking of justices and then re-ranking justices given the
ranking of cases until it converges to a solution that jointly gives a rank of both justices and
cases that minimizes the number of classification errors. In two dimensions, instead of rank
orderings, the OC method assigns a position in the space for each justice -or, more precisely,
an area where the justice is located- and for each case it gives a cutting line partitioning the
space into the area where it predicts that justices vote with the majority and the area where it
predicts that justices vote with the minority. Poole [26] provides a careful explanation of this
method.
To my best knowledge, the most complete analysis of the location of the ideal policies of
recent Supreme Court justices is the Supreme Court Ideal Point Research conducted by Martin
and Quinn [24] and [21], who use a probabilistic voting model and Bayesian inference to estimate
the ideal policies of the justices in a unidimensional space. A particularly useful feature of their
project is that they study the dynamics of the Court, and they update they results year by
year at the homesite of the project at adw.wustl.edu/supct.php. I take the average of the
estimates they report for the years 1995-2004. Estimates by Singular Value Decomposition
and the Optimal Classification method range from minus one (most liberal) to plus one (most
conservative). Martin and Quinn’s estimates could take any value in the real line, but since
the scaling of their estimates is arbitrary, I rescale their estimates dividing by five to ease the
comparison across rows in Table 3.
1.Ste 2.Gin Sou Bre 5.O’Co 6.Ken 7.Reh Sca Tho
SVD −0.425 −0.382 −0.351 −0.335 0.089 0.154 0.294 0.398 0.459
Eigen D −0.418 −0.296 −0.250 −0.253 0.161 0.212 0.348 0.455 0.459
OCM 1D 1st 2nd 4th 3rd 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th
OCM 2D −0.736 −0.583 −0.506 −0.498 0.169 0.274 0.489 0.704 0.661
M&Q −0.590 −0.302 −0.248 −0.221 0.099 0.146 0.289 0.598 0.678
Table 3: Estimates of the location of the ideal policies of the justices.
As shown in the table, the diﬀerent methods produce similar estimates that mostly corrob-
orate the initial ordering of the justices according to the proportion of liberal votes cast, as
coded by Spaeth [33].
The ordering according to Martin and Quinn and according to the Single Value Decompo-
sition (SVD) coincides exactly with the ordering according to the proportion of liberal votes.
It is important to note that the estimates from the SVD in the table correspond to the second
dimension of the SVD. The first dimension is an “agreement dimension” in which all justices
get a very similar value; this dimension captures the insight that justices tend to vote together
very frequently and it is only the second vector that provides the relevant information of the
location of the justices in the dimension of interest. I report the estimates for the first dimension
and the weight for all nine dimensions in the appendix. Sirovich [31] used the same method to
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study the voting patterns of the Court from 1995 to 2002, and his estimates are similar to mine
as was to be expected, with two diﬀerences. First, he fails to omit the unanimous decisions. As
a consequence, the first dimension in his analysis is more accurately an agreement dimension
in which all justices get an approximately equal estimate, and this (uninteresting) “agreement
dimension” carries more weight than in my analysis. Second, in my data Justice Souter appears
to be more liberal. This reflects the fact that Justice Souter gradually drifted during his tenure
in the Court, a fact also recorded by Martin and Quinn.
The estimates according to the first eigenvector of the Eigen Decomposition of the cross-
product of justices’ coordinates switch the positions of Souter and Breyer by a very slim margin,
and otherwise coincide with the proportion of liberal votes or the estimates by SVD.
The Optimal Classification method with one dimension again switches the ordering of Souter
and Breyer, but with two dimensions, Optimal Classification returns Souter back to the left of
Breyer and it alters the ordering of Scalia and Thomas.
All estimates agree in the following partial order ≺:
Ste ≺ Gin ≺ Sou
Bre
≺ O0Co ≺ Ken ≺ Reh ≺ Sca
Tho
.
The only open questions are the relative ordering of Breyer and Souter, and the relative ordering
of Scalia and Thomas. Rather than making a questionable assumption about these two pairs
of justices, I consider all four lineal orders consistent with the partial order ≺ and I evaluate
all the voting bloc structures that are connected according to one of these four lineal orders.
Formally, a partial order is a binary relation that is reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric.
A lineal order adds the property of being total, that is, it orders every pair of elements. For
instance, the coalition C = {Ste,Gin, Sou} is connected given the partial order ≺ because it is
connected given the linear order that ranks Souter third and Breyer fourth and the coalition C 0
= {Ste,Gin,Bre} is also connected given ≺ because it is connected given the linear order that
ranks Breyer third and Souter fourth. But if a coalition contains both Gin and O0Co, then it
must contain both Bre and Sou to be connected given ≺.
4.3 Endogenous Voting Blocs in the US Supreme Court
“People ask me whether I was sorry that I was in the minority in Bush vs Gore.
‘Of course I was sorry!’ I’m always sorry when I don’t have a majority.” Justice
Stephen Breyer of the US Supreme Court.8
To calculate the eﬀect of voting blocs upon the utility of the justices, it is necessary to make
an assumption about the utility function of the justices.
I assume that justices are outcome oriented: Each individual justice has policy preferences
over the outcome of each decision, and, as quoted from Justice Breyer, wants the Court to reach
a decision according to the preference of the justice. This assumption is consistent with the
8From “Breyer’s Big Idea”, by Jeﬀrey Toobin, in The New Yorker, October 31st, 2005, pages 36-43.
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attitudinal model of the Court by Segal and Spaeth [30], who consider competing models of the
functioning of the Court and conclude that a model of sincere voting by policy-oriented justices
best explains the decisions of the Court. In earlier work, Rohde [28], studied the formation of
coalitions in the writing of opinions in the Warren Court (1953-1968) and assumed that the
optimization problem of the justices is to have the policy output of the Court approximate
as closely as possible his own preference. If Segal and Spaeth [30] are correct and justices
vote sincerely, then each justice wanted the decision of the Court to coincide exactly with
the vote that the justice cast and every dissent is a defeat. Even if justices do not always
vote sincerely, it would be diﬃcult to discern the true preferences of the justices beyond their
revealed preferences, so I assign utilities according to the actual votes cast by the justices.
The Court makes a binary decision on the merits of each case: It either aﬃrms the ruling
from a lower court, or it reverses it; it sides with the plaintiﬀ, or with the defendant; with the
liberal position, or the conservative one. For instance, in a case in which a lower court took
a conservative view and sided with the plaintiﬀ, the outcome of the decision is either aﬃrm-
plaintiﬀ-conservative or reverse-defendant-liberal. I assume that each justice prefers one of
these two outcomes over the other and each justice gets a higher utility if his preferred outcome
is the one selected by the Court by majority voting. Then I assume that for the aggregate of
all 419 cases from 1995 to 2004 the goal of each justice was to maximize the number of cases
in which the decision of the Court coincides with the preference of the justices, as revealed by
the vote of the justice. Table 2 then provides the ultimate satisfaction of each justice with the
series of decisions of the Court: 419 minus the number of dissents is my measure of the utility
or satisfaction of each justice with the output of the Court from 1995 to 2004. This measure
of utility implicitly assumes that justices only care about how often they obtain a majority,
or in other words, that they do not care more about some decisions over others. While this
assumption is admittedly unrealistic, it is a simplifying step to circumvent the need to assign
weights for each case and justice.
I calculate how the outcomes would have changed if justices had formed voting blocs, and
how the satisfaction of each justice would have changed accordingly. For a given voting bloc
structure in the Court, I assume that each bloc holds a private internal vote before the division
of the Court, and in these internal votes I assume that each justice votes according to how the
justice voted in reality in that case. Then I aggregate the votes inside each bloc according to
the majority rule of the bloc, and I calculate the new outcome in the division of the Court, once
I take into account that some justices now cast a vote against their preference along the lines
dictated by the majority of their bloc. Finally, I calculate how many decisions change with the
voting bloc structure under consideration relative to the original data, and for each justice I
calculate the net balance of decisions that change to favor her preferences minus the number of
decisions that change against her preference.
Example 5 Suppose Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer form a voting bloc. Then the net change in
the number of decisions in which each justice is satisfied with the outcome is as follows:
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Bloc 1.Ste 2.Gin 3.Sou 4.Bre 5.O’Co 6.Ken 7.Reh 8.Sca 9.Tho
{234} 12 12 4 4 -2 -14 -10 -12 -14
Example 5 shows that had Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer committed to always vote together
rolling internal dissent among the three, each of them would have achieved their preferred
outcome more often even if sometimes they had to vote against their preference. Comparing
these numbers to those in Table 2, Ginsburg would reduce the number of cases that end up
against her preference by almost 8%. Souter and Breyer by about 3%.
If justices Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer had formed a voting bloc, 20 decisions out of 419
would have been reversed, Atwater vs City of Lago Vista (2001) among them. In a 5-4 decision,
the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not forbid a warrantless arrest for a minor
criminal oﬀense, such as a misdemeanor seatbelt violation punishable only by a fine. Justices
Souter, Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas voted with the majority. Justice O’Connor,
joined by Stevens, Ginsburg and Breyer, wrote a dissent arguing that a seatbelt violation is not
a reasonable ground for arrest, and thus the arrest is in violation of the Fourth Amendment
that prohibits unreasonable seizure. With the exception of Souters, there is a clean division of
the Court between more liberal justices favoring broader Civil Rights, and more conservative
justices favoring Law Enforcement. Had Souters voted with Ginsburg and Breyer, the Court
would have found the arrest to be unconstitutional.
More recently, in two famous cases decided on June 27, 2005, the Court ruled that the
display of the Ten Commandments in two courthouses in Kentucky is in violation of the First
Amendment Establishment Clause for the Separation of Church and State, but it also ruled that
a display of the Ten Commandments in the Texas State Capitol is not unconstitutional. Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter and O’Connor voted against the displays both in the Kentucky and
Texas cases, while justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas voted in favor of the displays
in both cases. Justice Breyer voted against the Kentucky displays in Mc Creary County vs
ACLU, giving the liberals a 5-4 majority, but he voted in favor of the Texas display in Van
Orden vs Perry, giving the conservatives a 5-4 majority. Had Breyer voted with Souter and
Ginsburg in both cases, the Texas display would have been ruled unconstitutional, just as the
Kentucky ones.
Note that when a justice in a voting bloc has to vote against his true preference in the
division of the Court, he would only be satisfied with the outcome if his vote -along with the
whole bloc he belongs to- ends up in the minority of the Court. Hence Example 5 doesn’t
measure the extra number of times that Ginsburg, Souter or Breyer are in the majority, but
the extra number of times that they are satisfied with the outcome. In so far as justices are
ideologically motivated, it is reasonable to say that for a justice to win means that the preferred
outcome of this justice prevails, regardless of whether the justice voted for or against her favored
outcome in the division of the Court.
Epstein and Knight [16] argue that justices make strategic choices deviating from their
preference for the sake of achieving the policy outcomes they desire so that the Law that
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emanates from the Supreme Court rulings is “the long term product of short-term strategic
decision-making.” I argue that if justices are strategic in their actions, then they must be
tempted to devise not just short-sighted strategies for one case, but rather long-term strategic
plans such as forming a voting bloc. For instance, if Justice Breyer had formed a voting bloc
with Ginsburg and Souter and no other justice had reacted to that bloc, Justice Breyer would
have lost fewer cases, exactly four less.
Assume the counterfactual that Ginsburg, Souter and Breyer form a voting bloc. This bloc
is Individual-Exit stable because all three members benefit from joining so none would want to
deviate and leave disbanding the bloc. However, the voting bloc structure in which Ginsburg,
Souter and Breyer form the only voting bloc is neither Nash stable, nor Split stable, because
other justices have incentives to react to this bloc. Table 4 displays the net payoﬀs to each
justice relative to the benchmark with no voting blocs if Stevens joins the bloc (first row),
and if the Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas form another voting bloc (second row). A summary
comparison between Table 4 and the table in Example 5 reveals that Stevens would benefit if
he joined the liberal bloc, increasing his net utility from +12 to +13. Hence the voting bloc
Gin−Sou−Bre is not Nash stable. The second row reveals that Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas
would reduce their loses from the formation of the Gin− Sou− Bre bloc if they formed their
own bloc.
Blocs 1.Ste 2.Gin 3.Sou 4.Bre 5.O’Co 6.Ken 7.Reh 8.Sca 9.Tho
{1234} 13 11 9 5 1 −15 −17 −13 −13
{234},{789} 5 −5 −7 −3 9 −1 −7 −3 −9
{123},{789} −1 −5 −5 3 9 −3 −7 −1 −11
{789} −5 −9 −13 −9 1 1 1 13 3
{123} 8 6 2 8 0 −10 −12 −6 −12
Table 4: Net change in satisfaction
A single bloc with the four liberal justices is Nash stable, but it is not Split stable, because
Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas have an incentive to form their own bloc to counterbalance the
four liberals just as much as they do against a bloc of three liberals.
On the other hand, the voting bloc structure with both a liberal bloc formed by Ginsburg,
Souter, Breyer and a conservative bloc formed by Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas is Nash stable and
Split stable. With the partial ordering ≺ discussed above, the following result summarizes my
findings on the stability of hypothetical voting blocs in a nine agent assembly whose members
faced an agenda and preference profile identical to those of the US Supreme Court justices
between 1995-2004.
Result 14 Any voting bloc structure in which three of the four most liberal justices (Stevens,
Ginsburg, Souter, Breyer) form a voting bloc and Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas form a second
voting bloc is Nash and Split stable, and there exists no other Split stable connected voting bloc
structure.
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I show the payoﬀs -net changes in the number of cases that each justice wins- given that
{Ste,Gin, Sou} form a voting bloc, and the three most conservative justices form another voting
bloc in row three of Table 4. For the sake of comparison, in rows four and five I show the payoﬀs
if one member of the liberal bloc deviates and the bloc dissolves, leaving {Reh, Sca, Tho} as
the unique bloc, and the payoﬀs if the conservative bloc dissolves and {Ste,Gin, Sou} remain
as a bloc. It is clear that no justice wants to abandon the bloc he belongs to.
In the appendix I provide a table with the payoﬀs for each justice for a sample of voting bloc
structures with a single bloc and for the two Split Stable voting bloc structures not already
listed in Table 4. For all other connected voting bloc structures, I provide the payoﬀs for
each justice and a deviation (if any exists) that makes such structure not Nash stable or not
Split stable in an Excel file that also contains the original data and formulas to replicate the
calculations. This file is available at www.hss.caltech.edu/~jon, or directly from the author.
According to Result 14, the stable voting bloc partitions are such that two opposing blocs -
one at each side of the ideological spectrum- counterbalance each other, and the swing moderate
agents, in this case O’Connor and Kennedy remain unaﬃliated, independent. Stable voting bloc
partitions merely reinforce the polarization of the Court into a liberal group and a conservative
group of justices, and do not produce a major realignment of votes. As a curiosity, the most
famous decision of this court, the 5-4 division in Bush vs Gore (2000) which stopped the recount
of the Florida votes and gave Bush the presidency would not have been reversed, since it was
already the case that the four liberals voted together in the minority, and the two moderate
conservatives and three conservatives voted together in the majority. The formation of a stable
connected voting bloc would have made this particular 5-4 conservative-liberal division more
frequent, but this was already the most frequent split of the Court.
Consider the stable voting bloc structure in which Stevens, Ginsburg and Souter form a
voting bloc, and Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas form another voting bloc. In terms of the
location of each of the blocs in an ideological space, each of the blocs converges near the
location of its median member. Indeed, the liberal bloc casts 313 liberal votes where Ginsburg
alone casts 308 (Stevens and Souter cast 344 and 307, see Table 2) and its position in space
according to SVD is -0.318, indistinguishable from Ginsburg’s in the dimension of interest,
while the conservative bloc casts 72 liberal votes for 84 of Scalia (98 and 71 by Rehnquist and
Thomas) and locates by SVD at 0.392, where Scalia alone is at 0.398.
Compare Result 14 with the stylized assembly with 9 agents who have symmetric and
independent types. Note that the stable voting bloc structures in Result 14 are a subset of those
in the idealized assembly. The theory predicted that stable voting bloc structures would consist
of two blocs of size three, one with three of the four most liberal members, the other with three
of the four most conservative members. The prediction with the empirical data fits within this
set of stable voting bloc structures, and the only diﬀerence is that the conservative bloc has to be
{789} and cannot be {678} instead. The cause of this diﬀerence is that the modelled assembly
assumed that agents 3 and 4 and agents 6 and 7 are identical. In the empirical application,
Souter and Breyer are indeed similar enough in their voting behavior, but Kennedy is markedly
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diﬀerent from Rehnquist, and in particular Kennedy is not conservative enough to benefit from
forming a bloc with Rehnquist and Scalia.
The following two comments suggest that Result 14 should be interpreted with caution.
First, the Split stable voting bloc structures are in accordance to those predicted by the more
abstract model and reinforce the intuition that the assembly is likely to split into two opposing
voting blocs that counterbalance each other, one at each side of the ideological spectrum and
leaving a number of unaﬃliated moderate independents. However, this result is based on the
particular stability concept that I have chosen. The question of which equilibrium refinement
or which stability concept is appropriate is still open in the literature.
Second, this section has shown what voting bloc structures would be stable in an assembly
with nine rational agents who are strategic and can coordinate their votes without constraints,
and whose preferences are consistent with those revealed by the pattern of votes in the US
Supreme Court for 1995-2004. It has not provided, nor did it intend to provide, a theory of
voting in the Court. I leave to Supreme Court scholars these tasks. Restraints of a legal,
normative or ethical nature may deter Supreme Court justices from committing to vote as a
bloc and this section doesn’t attempt to explain voting in the US Supreme Court as much as it
intends to illustrate how voting blocs could aﬀect outcomes in practice, and what voting bloc
structures would be stable. The data from the US Supreme Court serves by proxy to shed
some light into the formation of voting blocs in committees, councils, small assemblies, and
all sorts of political caucuses, in which the incentives to form the blocs will be salient and the
restraints that Supreme Court justices face are probably absent -and, crucially, the data on the
preferences of its members is also absent.
I have proved that members of a committee or assembly with size and preferences identical
to those of the US Supreme Court face strategic incentives to coalesce into voting blocs. An
explanation of whether or not the US Supreme Court justices act upon these strategic incentives
is beyond the scope of this paper.
5 Conclusion and Extensions
Members of a democratic assembly -legislature, council, committee- can aﬀect the policy out-
come by forming voting blocs. A voting bloc coordinates the voting behavior of its members
according to an internal voting rule independent of the rule of the assembly, and this coordina-
tion of votes aﬀects the outcome in the division of the assembly.
I have shown that stable voting bloc structures exist for various concepts of stability in a
model in which agents with heterogeneous preferences coalesce into voting blocs endogenously.
In a model with two parties that can each form a voting bloc I have shown the necessary
and suﬃcient condition for every member in a party to have an incentive to join the bloc, and
how these incentives change with variations on the type of the agents, the voting rule chosen
by the parties, the sizes of the parties and the polarization of the assembly.
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I have illustrated how voting blocs aﬀect voting outcomes using data from the US Supreme
Court decisions between 1995 and 2004.
The theory in this paper has multiple natural extensions: Comparing the results under other
stability concepts, such as Coalition-Proofness or Equilibrium Binding Agreements; endogeniz-
ing the choice of the internal voting rule for each bloc and allowing for a richer class of rules,
not just anonymous and majoritarian rules; studying the enforceability of the internal rules in
a repeated game if binding commitments are not feasible; introducing intensity of preferences
so that agents who like the proposal do so to varying degrees; considering unequally weighted
individuals or even pyramidal structures, in which individual agents coalesce into factions, fac-
tions coalesce into parties (voting blocs of second order), parties into alliances (voting blocs of
third order) and so on... Empirical applications range from revisiting the historical records of
the early United States Congress to try to determine the incentives to coordinate votes along
State lines or along parties, to salient current developments such as the theoretical advantages
to each of the 25 European Union countries from pooling their votes under a common foreign
EU policy. These questions constitute an agenda for further research.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
To prove this lemma I first prove three intermediate steps. First I show that if a coalition C
leans right and the type of one of the members of C shifts to the right (becomes higher), then
the resulting coalition also leans right. Second I show that given a coalition C that leads right,
if the left-most member of C (the member with the lowest type) leaves the coalition, then the
resulting coalition also leans right. Third, I show that if M is symmetric and L leans left and
forms a voting bloc, then the distribution of the number of votes cast by L∪M in the division
of the assembly is such that given any absolute diﬀerence between the number of votes L ∪M
casts for and against the proposal, the net diﬀerence is negative with probability at least a half.
Readers who find these three claims obviously true may skip down to the proof of Lemma 1
itself below.
Claim 15 Let C ⊆ N be such that NC is even and gC(NC2 − k) ≤ gC(NC2 + k) for any positive
integer k. Let C 0 = l0 ∪C\l with tl0 > tl. Then
gC
0
(
NC
2
− k) ≤ gC0(NC
2
+ k) for any positive integer k.
Proof. Consider C\l and let GC−l be the distribution function of
P
i∈C\l
si. Its probability mass
function gC−l is determined by the aggregation of independent Bernoulli experiments, hence it is
unimodal, as shown by Darroch [12]. Let y denote the mode. Since preferences are independent,
for any number x and any agent l,
gC(x) = tlg
C
−l(x− 1) + (1− tl)gC−l(x)
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Hence
gC0(x)− gC(x) = (tl0 − tl)[gC−l(x− 1)− gC−l(x)] (1)
Since gC−l is unimodal, for any x > y it follows that g
C
−l(x) ≤ gC−l(x − 1) and expression (1) is
positive and for any x ≤ y it follows that gC−l(x) ≥ gC−l(x − 1) and expression (1) is negative.
It also follows from the unimodality of gC−l that the modes of g
C and gC
0
are either y or y + 1,
call them yC and yC
0
respectively. Further, since gC(NC2 − 1) ≤ gC(
NC
2 + 1), it must be that
NC
2 ≤ yC ≤ y+1. Hence
NC
2 − 1 ≤ y and gC
0
(NC2 − k) ≤ gC(
NC
2 − k) for any positive integer k.
For k such that NC2 + k > y
C0 ≥ y, it follows that
gC
0
(
NC
2
− k) ≤ gC(NC
2
− k) ≤ gC(NC
2
+ k) ≤ gC0(NC
2
+ k),
where the first and third inequalities hold by the sign of expression (1) and the second inequality
by assumption.
For k such that NC2 + k ≤ yC
0
, gC
0
(NC2 − k) ≤ gC
0
(NC2 + k) by the unimodality of g
C0 .
The proof is similar for C of odd size, with gC
0
(NC−12 − k) ≤ gC
0
(NC+12 + k) for any non
negative integer k.
Claim 16 Let C ⊆ N be such that NC is even and let tl ≤ ti for any i ∈ C. Suppose that
gC(NC2 − k) ≤ gC(
NC
2 + k) for all positive k. Then g
C
−l(
NC
2 − 1 − k) ≤ gC−l(
NC
2 + k) for any
non-negative integer k.
Proof. Note that the statement is immediately true if tl ≥ 1/2. We only need to prove it for
tl < 1/2. First construct C 0 = {C ∪ l0}\l with tl0 = 1/2. By Claim 15, for any non-negative
integer k, coalition C 0 satisfies
gC
0
(
NC
2
− k) ≤ gC0(NC
2
+ k). (2)
The rest of the proof proceeds by induction. First, for k = NC2 − 1, I prove that gC
0
−l0(0) ≤
gC
0
−l0(NC − 1).
From inequality (2), gC
0
(0) ≤ gC0(NC). It follows (1 − tl0)gC−l(0) ≤ tl0gC−l(NC − 1). Since
tl0 = 1/2, then gC−l(0) ≤ gC−l(NC − 1).
Suppose that gC−l(
NC−2
2 − k) ≤ gC−l(
NC
2 + k) holds for k = k
0. I then show that it holds for
k = k0 − 1.
From gC
0
(NC2 − k0) ≤ gC
0
(NC2 + k
0), get
tl0g
C0
−l0(
NC − 2
2
−k0)+(1− tl0)gC
0
−l0(
NC
2
−k0) ≤ tl0gC
0
−l0(
NC
2
+k0− 1)+(1− tl0)gC
0
−l0(
NC
2
+k0) (3)
gC
0
−l0(
NC − 2
2
− k0) + gC0−l0(
NC
2
− k0) ≤ gC0−l0(
NC
2
+ k0 − 1) + gC0−l0(
NC
2
+ k0) (4)
gC
0
−l0(
NC
2
− k0) ≤ gC0−l0(
NC
2
+ k0 − 1) (5)
gC−l(
NC − 2
2
− (k0 − 1)) ≤ gC−l(
NC
2
+ k0 − 1) (6)
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Expression (3) implies (4) because tl0 = (1 − tl0) = 1/2. Expression (4) implies (5) because
gC−l(
NC−2
2 − k0) ≤ gC−l(
NC
2 + k
0) by assumption. Expression (6) is merely a reformulation of (5).
The induction argument is then complete.
Claim 17 Let N = L ∪M ∪ R. Suppose gM(NM−12 − k) = gM(NM+12 + k), gL(NL−12 − k) ≤
gL(NL+12 + k) for all non-negative k and L forms a voting bloc (L, rL). Then:
P [
X
i∈L∪M
vi =
NL +NM
2
− k] ≥ P [
X
i∈L∪M
vi =
NL +NM
2
+ k] for any positive k.
Proof. Lets first define L to be active given a preference profile s if it rolls its internal minority
given the rule rL, so that si 6= vi for some i ∈ L and let us define L to be inactive otherwise.
Then the probability that L ∪M casts x votes in favor of the policy proposal is
P
" X
i∈L∪M
vi = x|L active
#
P [L active] + P
" X
i∈L∪M
vi = x|L inactive
#
P [L inactive].
I first want to show that
P
" X
i∈L∪M
vi =
NL +NM
2
− k|L active
#
≥
"
P
X
i∈L∪M
vi =
NL +NM
2
+ k|L active
#
. (7)
Noting that if L is active then
P
i∈L
vi ∈ {0, NL}, that
P
i∈M
vi =
P
i∈M
si for all preference profiles,
and that
P [
X
i∈M
si =
NM − 1
2
− k] = P [
X
i∈M
si =
NM + 1
2
+ k]
for any k, rewrite inequality 7 as:
P [
X
i∈L
vi = NL|L active]P [
X
i∈M
si =
NM −NL
2
− k] + P [
X
i∈L
vi = 0|L active]P [
X
i∈M
si =
NM +NL
2
− k] ≥
P [
X
i∈L
vi = NL|L active]P [
X
i∈M
si =
NM +NL
2
− k] + P [
X
i∈L
vi = 0|L active]P [
X
i∈M
si =
NM −NL
2
− k].
Regrouping terms: Ã
P [
X
i∈L
vi = NL|L active]− P [
X
i∈L
vi = 0|L active]
!
Ã
P [
X
i∈M
si =
NM −NL
2
− k]− P [
X
i∈M
si =
NM +NL
2
− k]
!
≥ 0.
Since L leans left, the first term is weakly positive; since the distribution of the number of
agents in M who favor the policy proposal is symmetric (and unimodal), the second term is
negative. Thus the expression is weakly negative, as desired.
Second, I want to show that
P
" X
i∈L∪M
vi =
NL +NM
2
− k|L inactive
#
≥ P
" X
i∈L∪M
vi =
NL +NM
2
+ k|L inactive
#
. (8)
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Note that L is inactive if and only if (1− rL)NL <
P
i∈L
si < rLNL.
P
" X
i∈L∪M
vi =
NL +NM
2
+ k|L inactive
#
− P
" X
i∈L∪M
vi =
NL +NM
2
− k|L inactive
#
=
rLNL−
NL+3
2X
h=0
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
P [
P
i∈L
si =
NL+1
2 + h|L inactive]
µ
P [
P
i∈M
si =
NM−1
2 + k − h]− P [
P
i∈M
si =
NM−1
2 − k − h]
¶
+
P [
P
i∈L
si =
NL−1
2 − h|L inactive]
µ
P [
P
i∈M
si =
NM+1
2 + k + h]− P [
P
i∈M
si =
NM+1
2 − k + h]
¶
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎭
=
rLNL−
NL+3
2X
h=0
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
µ
P [
P
i∈L
si =
NL+1
2 + h|L inactive]− P [
P
i∈L
si =
NR−1
2 − h|L inactive]
¶
µ
P [
P
i∈M
si =
NM−1
2 + k − h]− P [
P
i∈M
si =
NM−1
2 − k − h]
¶
⎫
⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎭
.
For any h and k, the first parenthesis is negative because L leans left, and the second one is
positive because the distribution of the number of agents inM who favor the policy proposal is
unimodal and symmetric around NM/2. Thus the whole expression is negative and inequality
(8) holds as desired.
I now prove Lemma 1.
Proof. For any h ∈ R, let
Ah = P [
X
i∈R−h
si = rRNR − 1]P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm ∈ [
NL +NM
2
− NR − 1
2
,
NL +NM
2
+
NR − 1
2
− rRNR]]
−P [
X
i∈R−h
si ≤ (1− rR)NR − 1]P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm =
NL +NM
2
+
NR − 1
2
]
and similarly let
Bh = P [
X
i∈R−h
si = (1− rR)NR]P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm ∈ [
NL +NM
2
− NR − 1
2
+ rRNR,
NL +NM
2
+
NR − 1
2
]
−P [
X
i∈R−h
si ≥ rRNR]P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm =
NL +NM
2
− NR − 1
2
]
Then h prefers to participate in the voting bloc (R, rR) if and only if thAh + (1 − th)Bh > 0.
Suppose tlAl + (1− tl)Bl > 0. We want to show that
thAh + (1− th)Bh − tlAl − (1− tl)Bl ≥ 0
which implies thAh + (1− th)Bh > 0.
Let
P1 = P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm ∈ [
NM +NL
2
− NR − 1
2
,
NM +NL
2
+
NR − 1
2
− rRNR]],
P2 = P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm ∈ [
NM +NL
2
− NR − 1
2
+ rRNR,
NM +NL
2
+
NR − 1
2
]],
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P3 = P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm =
NL +NM
2
+
NR − 1
2
], and P4 = P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm =
NM +NL
2
− NR − 1
2
].
Then, thAh + (1− th)Bh is equal to:
th
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Ã
tlP [
P
i∈R−lh
si = rRNR − 2] + (1− tl)P [
P
i∈R−lh
si = rRNR − 1]
!
P1
−
Ã
tlP [
P
i∈R−lh
si ≤ (1− rR)NR − 2] + (1− tl)P [
P
i∈R−lh
si ≤ (1− rR)NR − 1]
!
P3
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(9)
+ (1− th)
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Ã
tlP [
P
i∈R−lh
si = (1− rR)NR − 1] + (1− tl)P [
P
i∈R−lh
si = (1− rR)NR]
!
P2
−
Ã
tlP [
P
i∈R−lh
si ≥ rRNR − 1] + (1− tl)P [
P
i∈R−lh
si ≥ rRNR]
!
P4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
and tlAl + (1− tl)Bl is equal to
tl
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Ã
thP [
P
i∈R−lh
si = rRNR − 2] + (1− th)P [
P
i∈R−lh
si = rRNR − 1]
!
P1
−
Ã
thP [
P
i∈R−lh
si ≤ (1− rR)NR − 2] + (1− th)P [
P
i∈R−lh
si ≤ (1− rR)NR − 1]
!
P3
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(10)
+ (1− tl)
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
Ã
thP [
P
i∈R−lh
si = (1− rR)NR − 1] + (1− th)P [
P
i∈R−lh
si = (1− rR)NR]
!
P2
−
Ã
thP [
P
i∈R−lh
si ≥ rRNR − 1] + (1− th)P [
P
i∈R−lh
si ≥ rRNR]
!
P4
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Therefore thAh + (1− th)Bh − tlAl − (1− tl)Bl is equal to
(th − tl)
⎛
⎜⎝
P [
P
i∈R−lh
si = rRNR − 1]P1 − P [
P
i∈R−lh
si = (1− rR)NR − 1]P2
+P [
P
i∈R−lh
si ≥ rRNR − 1]P4 − P [
P
i∈R−lh
si ≤ (1− rR)NR − 1]P3
⎞
⎟⎠ . (11)
Since M is symmetric and L leans left, it follows by Claim 17 that P1 ≥ P2 and P3 ≤ P4, and
since R−h leans right, by Claim 16 R−lh leans right as well. Then, the expression (11) above is
weakly positive.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. By Lemma 1, if l prefers to participate in the voting bloc, every member of R does.
Therefore, (R, rR) is Individual-Exit stable if and only if l wants to participate in the bloc. Using
the notation from Lemma 1, l wants to participate in the bloc if and only if tlAl+(1−tl)Bl ≥ 0.
Suppose Al ≥ Bl, then the expression is increasing in tl and the cutoﬀ that makes the agent
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indiﬀerent is at tInR(rR, rL,t−l) =
−Bl
Al−Bl . Hence, it suﬃces to show that Al ≥ Bl.
Al = P [
X
i∈R−l
si = rRNR − 1]P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm ∈ [
NM +NL
2
− NR − 1
2
,
NM +NL
2
+
NR − 1
2
− rRNR]]
−P [
X
i∈R−l
si ≤ (1− rR)NR − 1]P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm =
NM +NL
2
+
NR − 1
2
],
Bh = P [
X
i∈R−l
si = (1− rR)NR]P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm ∈ [
NM +NL
2
− NR − 1
2
+ rRNR,
NM +NL
2
+
NR − 1
2
]
−P [
X
i∈R−l
si ≥ rRNR]P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm =
NM +NL
2
− NR − 1
2
].
Since R−l leans right, for any rR ≥ NR+12NR ,
P [
X
i∈R−l
si = rRNR − 1] ≥ P [
X
i∈R−l
si = (1− rR)NR]
and
P [
X
i∈R−l
si ≥ rRNR] ≥ P [
X
i∈R−l
si ≤ (1− rR)NR − 1].
Since M is symmetric and L leans left,
P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm ∈ [
NL +NM
2
− NR − 1
2
,
NL +NM
2
+
NR − 1
2
− rRNR]]
≥ P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm ∈ [
NL +NM
2
− NR − 1
2
+ rRNR,
NL +NM
2
+
NR − 1
2
]
and
P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm =
NL +NM
2
+
NR − 1
2
] ≤ P [
X
m∈M∪L
vm =
NL +NM
2
− NR − 1
2
].
Therefore, Al ≥ Bl.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 4
This proof and the proof of Proposition 7 use the result in Proposition 8 below. While it is in
principle inadvisable to use latter results in proofs that appear earlier in the text, Proposition 8
shows that voting blocs generate a gain in utility in a more general model with an endogenous
number of voting blocs. To prove the result first for two blocs to use it here and then prove
it again in greater generality would be redundant. I also use the notion of a “voting bloc
structure” from Definition 4. In short, a voting bloc structure (π, r) is a pair composed of a
partition of the assembly π, and a vector r that contains one rule for each voting bloc resulting
from the partition π.
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Proof. Let (π, r) be a voting bloc structure in which R does not form a voting bloc. Let (π0, r0)
be another voting bloc structure in which R forms a voting bloc with rR =
NR−1
NR
and all else
remains equal. From Proposition 8,
P
i∈R
ui(π0, r0) ≥
P
i∈R
ui(π, r). Let (π00, r00) be a third voting
bloc structure in which i deviates and leaves the bloc (R, rR) to become an independent, so
the bloc shrinks to (R\i, rR). Note that the new size of the bloc is NR − 1. Hence the number
necessary to command a suﬃcient majority to roll the minority inside the bloc is
rR(NR − 1) = NR − 1−
NR − 1
NR
> NR − 2.
The new bloc only votes together if the internal majority is of size NR − 1. In other words,
rR is eﬀectively unanimity once i leaves the bloc. Under this rule R\i behaves exactly as if it
didn’t form a bloc and all agents were independent. Thus,X
i∈R
ui(π00, r00) =
X
i∈R
ui(π, r) ≤
X
i∈R
ui(π0, r0).
Since all agents in R are identical, it follows that for all i ∈ R,
ui(π
00, r00) ≤ ui(π0, r0).
Therefore, no agent wants to leave R and R is Individual-Exit stable.
6.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. From Proposition 4, if rR = NR−1NR and R is homogeneous, then (R, rR) is Individual-
Exit stable. Hence it suﬃces to show that there exist a homogeneous type profile for R such
that with simple majority the bloc is not stable. Let P [
P
i∈M∪L
vi = N+12 − NR] = λ. By the
assumption on sizes and types of M and L, λ > 0. Let the common type of agents in R be
1− ε. Let E be the event that i ∈ R rejects the proposal, a majority of R favors the proposal,
and
P
i∈M∪L
vi = N+12 −NR. In this event, i is better oﬀ if she is not part of the bloc. Note that
lim
ε→0
1
ε
P [E] = λ.
Agent i is better oﬀ inside the bloc only if the rest of the bloc is tied. But
lim
ε→0
1
ε
P [
X
j∈R
sj =
NR − 1
2
] = 0.
Therefore, for a suﬃciently low ε the probability that i is better oﬀ outside the bloc outweighs
the probability that i is better oﬀ inside the bloc and i prefers to leave the bloc.
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6.5 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Let xh be the highest coordinate of the vector x and let ε = αxh be the highest type
in L. L is stable if εAh + (1− ε)Bh > 0.
Ah = P
⎡
⎣ X
i∈L−h
si = rLNL − 1
⎤
⎦P
" X
m∈M∪L
vm ∈
∙
M +NR
2
− NL − 1
2
,
M +NR
2
+
NL − 1
2
− rLNL
¸#
−P
⎡
⎣ X
i∈L−h
si ≤ (1− rL)NL − 1
⎤
⎦P
" X
m∈M∪R
vm =
M +NR
2
+
NL − 1
2
#
.
Bh = P
⎡
⎣ X
i∈L−h
si = (1− rL)NL
⎤
⎦P
" X
m∈M∪R
vm ∈
∙
M +NR
2
− NL − 1
2
+ rLNL,
M +NR
2
+
NL − 1
2
¸#
−P
⎡
⎣ X
i∈L−h
si ≥ rLNL
⎤
⎦P
" X
m∈M∪R
vm =
M +NR
2
− NL − 1
2
#
.
Let
P5 = P
" X
m∈M∪R
vm ∈
∙
M +NR
2
− NL − 1
2
,
M +NR
2
+
NL − 1
2
− rLNL
¸#
,
P7 = P
" X
m∈M∪R
vm ∈
∙
M +NR
2
− NL − 1
2
+ rLNL,
M +NR
2
+
NL − 1
2
¸#
,
P6 = P
" X
m∈M∪R
vm =
M +NR
2
+
NL − 1
2
#
and γ =
(NL − 1)!
(rLNL − 1)!(NL − rLNL)!
.
Then,
εAh + (1− ε)Bh < εγεrLNL−1P5 − ε(1− ε)NL−1P6 + (1− ε)γε(1−rL)NLP7.
Divide the right hand side by ε and take the limit as ε goes to zero.
lim
ε→0
γεrLNL−1P5 − (1− ε)NL−1P6 + (1− ε)γε(1−rL)NL−1P7 = −P6 < 0.
Hence, if ε is low enough, εAh+(1−ε)Bh < 0 and the voting bloc is not Individual-Exit stable.
6.6 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Let the vector of types be such that ti = tj for all i, j ∈ L. Then, by Proposition 8, every
i ∈ L weakly benefits from the formation of the voting bloc (L, rL) and hence it is a weakly
undominated strategy for every i ∈ L to commit to participate in the bloc. By Proposition 6,
if the common type of L is low enough, (L, rL) is not Individual-Exit stable.
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6.7 Proof of Proposition 8
Proposition 8 and its proof follow very closely Propositions 1 in Eguia [15], extending the result
from one to several voting blocs.
Proof. Let (π, r) be the initial voting bloc structure and (π0, r0) the new voting bloc structure
in which r0 = {rj}Jj=0∪r0J+1 and π0 = {C 0j}J+1j=0 is a finer partition of π such that C0J+1∪C 00 = C0
and C 0j = Cj for all j = {1, ..., J}. For notational simplicity, let C 0J+1be just C 0 and r0J+1simply
r0C .
Given s, suppose
P
i∈C0
si ≤ (1− r0C)NC0 . Then
P
i∈C0
vi(π0, r0, s) ≤
P
i∈C
vi(π, r, s) and since the
votes of other agents are unaﬀected by the formation or not of a bloc (C 0, r0C), it follows thatP
i∈N
vi(π0, r0, s) ≤
P
i∈N
vi(π, r, s). Hence, either the outcome is the same under (π, r) and (π0, r0),
or if the outcome changes, it must be that the policy proposal passes under (π, r) but fails
under (π0, r0) and then every agent who is against the proposal benefits from the formation of
the bloc (C 0, r0C) and every agent who likes the policy proposal is hurt. If the outcome changes,
the aggregate gain in utility for the coalition C 0 is equal to NC0 − 2
P
i∈C0
si ≥ (2r0C − 1)NC0 ≥ 1.
Suppose instead that (1− r0C)NC0 <
P
i∈C0
si < r0CNC0 . Then the formation of the voting bloc
(C 0, r0C) does not aﬀect the voting behavior, the policy outcome or the utility of any agent.
Finally, suppose that
P
i∈C0
si ≥ r0CNC0 . Then, by a symmetric logic to the one in the first case,
the outcome can only change from rejecting to accepting the policy proposal, which benefits a
majority of members of the new bloc.
Hence, either the bloc has no eﬀect, or if it has an eﬀect, it generates a strictly positive
surplus of utility for its members.
Simple majority maximizes this surplus because with simple majority the bloc always rolls
its internal minorities, maximizing the number of preference profiles s for which it alters the
outcome in favor of the majority of the voting bloc.
6.8 Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. First I show that the voting bloc structures described in the proposition are relevant,
then that they are Individual-Exit stable, and finally that at least one of them exists.
Suppose
P
i∈C
si =
P
i∈N
si = rCNC < rNN so the policy proposal fails if vi = si for all i ∈ N .
However, if the voting bloc (C, rC) forms, the proposal wins the internal voting of the bloc,P
i∈C
vi =
P
i∈N
vi = NC ≥ rNN and the proposal passes in the division of the assembly. Since
Ω(s) has full support,
P
i∈C
si =
P
i∈N
si = rCNC occurs with positive probability and the bloc is
relevant.
Since by assumption NC − 1 ≥ rNN, the bloc remains a dictator after losing one member.
Suppose i ∈ C and vi = si, agent i is at least equally well oﬀ staying in the bloc since i is
already voting her preference and by leaving she can never increase the number of other agents
who vote for her preference in the division of the assembly. Suppose i ∈ C and vi 6= si. Then it
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must be that i lost in the internal vote of the bloc, and vj 6= si for all j ∈ C. If i leaves the bloc,
it would still be that a suﬃcient majority of members of C oppose i0s preference, and vj 6= si
for all j ∈ C\i. Since the bloc without i remains a dictator, i still loses in the division of the
assembly after her defection from the bloc. Therefore, agent i can never be better oﬀ leaving
the bloc and the bloc is Individual-Exit stable.
Finally, I want to show that for any rN ≤ N−1N and any N ≥ 7 there exists an rC and NC
such that rC > 12 , rCNC is an integer, NC ≥ rNN + 1 and rCNC < rNN so that the second
statement in the proposition applies. This is straightforward: If rN = N+12N , let NC = N − 2
and rC = N−12(N−2) , and if rN >
N+1
2N , let rC =
N+1
2N and NC = N.
6.9 Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. First consider the with rN ∈ (N+12N ,
N−1
N ]. Then, by Proposition 9, any voting bloc
structure with a unique voting bloc (C, rC) such that C = N and rC < rN is relevant and
Individual-Exit stable. Since there are no agents outside the bloc, there is no possible deviation
by entering the bloc and the voting bloc structure is also Individually stable.
Suppose instead that rN = N+12N . Let (π, r) be any voting bloc structure with a unique
voting bloc (C, rC) such that NC = N − 2 and rC = NC+12NC so that rCNC =
NC+1
2 =
N−1
2 .
By Proposition 9, the voting bloc structure is relevant and Individual-Exit stable, so the only
deviations that need to be ruled out are those by a non-member who enters the bloc. Suppose
a non-member l deviates and enters the bloc, so that the new bloc is now (C ∪ l, rC). The
deviation aﬀects the outcome in the division of the assembly only if
P
i∈C∪l
si = N−12 . In this
case, the result in the new bloc is a tie. Without l, the result was an internal majority of 1
against the preference of l and the whole bloc casting all its votes against the preference of l in
the division of the assembly. If by entering the bloc and bringing a tie inside the bloc l reverts
the outcome in the division of the assembly, then a majority of members of C are hurt by the
inclusion of l. Thus, there is a net loss of utility for the members of C. It must then be that
in expectation at least one of them is ex-ante worse oﬀ by the entry of agent l, so member l
cannot deviate by entering. Consider the incentives of any i ∈ C to leave the bloc. For any s
such that vi(π, r, s) = si member i is at least equally well oﬀ staying in the bloc. Therefore,
the bloc is Individually stable.
6.10 Proof of Proposition 12
Proof. The grand coalition C = N with rC ∈ [rN , 1] is irrelevant, but Nash stable. For
any s such that agent vi(N , rC , s) = si, agent i is at least equally well oﬀ remaining in the
bloc. For any s such that si = 0 but vi(N , rC , s) = 1 it must be that
P
j∈N\i
sj ≥ rCN ≥
rC(N − 1) so if i leaves the bloc, all N − 1 members vote in favor of the proposal and the
proposal passes, so i is not better oﬀ. For any s such that si = 1 but vi(N , rC , s) = 0 it must
be that
P
j∈N\i
sj ≤ (1− rC)N − 1 ≤ (1− rC)(N − 1) so if i leaves the whole bloc votes against
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the proposal, the proposal fails and i is not better oﬀ. Overall, an agent can never change the
outcome towards her preference by leaving the grand coalition, so (N , rC) with rC ∈ [rN , 1] is
Nash stable.
6.11 Proof of Proposition 13
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose ∃(C, rC) such that rC is simple majority and N+12 ≤ NC .
If NC = N, then the bloc is not relevant -a contradiction. Suppose NC < N . For any s such
that
P
h∈C
sh 6= NC2 , it follows that
P
h∈C
vh ∈ {0, NC} and the policy outcome in the division of
the assembly coincides with the vote of the bloc; since the policy outcome is independent of
the votes outside the voting bloc, any i /∈ C is at least equally well-oﬀ entering the voting bloc.
For any s such that
P
h∈C
sh =
NC
2 , any i /∈ C who joins the bloc causes
P
h∈C∪i
vh = siNC and
i wins in the division of the assembly with all the votes of the bloc; if i was winning outside
of the bloc, i is indiﬀerent between winning outside the bloc or being pivotal to win inside the
bloc, and if i was losing i is strictly better oﬀ entering the bloc. There is no preference profile
s for which an agent i is better oﬀ staying out of the bloc.
If the bloc is odd-sized, ties cannot occur. To find a case in which i is strictly better oﬀ
entering a bloc of odd size, let s be such that
P
h∈C
sh =
P
h∈N
sh =
NC+1
2 . Then
P
h∈C
vh =
P
h∈N
vh =
NC ≥ N+12 and the proposal passes. If one of the non-members -who oppose the proposal- joins
the bloc, then the expanded bloc is tied,
P
i∈N
vi =
P
h∈C∪i
vh =
P
h∈C
sh < N+12 and the proposal
does not pass in the assembly. Therefore, regardless of whether ties can occur or not in the
bloc, for any non-member i there exist preference profiles for which i is strictly better oﬀ joining
the bloc. Since Ω has full support, every preference profile occurs with positive probability and
every non-member strictly prefers to join the bloc. Then, if C 6= N , the voting bloc structure
is not Nash stable -a contradiction.
Suppose the voting bloc structure (π, r) is such that C0 6= ∅, and ∃(C, rC) relevant such that
NC ≥ N+12 . Let (π0, r) be a new voting bloc structure such that C 0 = C ∪ i and C 00 = C0\i and
all else is unchanged. Let s be a preference profile such that vi(π0, r, s) = si. Then ui(π0, r, s) ≥
ui(π, r, s) since i joining the bloc can never reduce the number of votes cast by other bloc
members for the option preferred by i. Suppose instead that s is such that vi(π0, r, s) 6= si.
Since the bloc is a dictator in the assembly, then ui(π0, r, s) = 0. But note that the bloc would
also vote against i if i remained out of the bloc. Since the bloc without i is also a dictator,
ui(π, r, s) = 0. So the agent is in this case indiﬀerent about joining the bloc. In either case, an
agent is never worse oﬀ joining the bloc. Let s be such that
P
h∈C
sh = (1 − rC)NC and sk = 1
for all k /∈ C. Then
P
h∈C
vh = 0 and the proposal fails in the division of the assembly. Since
the voting bloc is relevant,
P
h∈C
sh +
P
k/∈C
sk ≥ N+12 and the proposal would pass if the members
of the voting bloc voted sincerely in the assembly. Suppose i /∈ C enters the bloc, so that
C 0 = C ∪ i. Then
P
h∈C0
sh > (1− rC)NC0 and
P
h∈C
vh =
P
h∈C
sh so that the policy proposal passes
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in the division of the assembly and i is better oﬀ -a contradiction.
6.12 Estimates by Eigen-D, SVD and OCM-2D
Single values 1.Ste 2.Gin Sou Bre 5.O’Co 6.Ken 7.Reh Sca Tho
1st-Eigenvector −0.418 −0.298 −0.250 −0.253 0.161 0.212 0.348 0.455 0.459
2nd-Eigenvector 0.339 0.026 0.198 −0.467 −0.493 −0.146 −0.348 0.277 0.406
SVD 1st Dim −0.241 −0.306 −0.331 −0.326 −0.404 −0.397 −0.359 −0.301 −0.304
SVD 2nd Dim −0.425 −0.382 −0.351 −0.335 0.089 0.154 0.294 0.398 0.402
OCM 1st Dim −0.736 −0.583 −0.506 −0.498 0.169 0.274 0.489 0.704 0.661
OCM 2nd Dim 0.569 0.087 0.387 −0.730 −0.710 −0.182 −0.524 0.482 0.661
Dimension i 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th
Eigenvalue αi −0.817 0.082 0.044 0.037 0.022 −0.021 0.015 −0.008 0.006
Weight Dim λi SVD 0.385 0.179 0.079 0.072 0.067 0.062 0.056 0.052 0.047
The top table contains the first and second eigenvectors obtained by the Eigen Decompo-
sition of the double-centered matrix of squared distances of the justices, the estimates of the
location of the justices in the first and second dimension by Single Value Decomposition and
the estimates of the location in the first and second dimensions obtained by the Optimal Classi-
fication method with two dimensions. Note that the first dimension with SVD is an “agreement
dimension” where all justices take a similar position, and it is only the second dimension that
is the relevant and meaningful one, comparable to the first dimension in the other methods.
The bottom table provides the nine single values of the Eigen Decomposition, and the weights
of the nine dimensions from the SVD (to obtain the single value of each dimension, multiply
by 11.065).
6.13 Table following Result 14
Bloc structure 1.Ste 2.Gin 3.Sou 4.Bre 5.O’Co 6.Ken 7.Reh 8.Sca 9.Tho
{124}, {789} −1 −5 −1 −1 9 −3 −7 −1 −7
{134}, {789} −1 1 −7 −3 11 −3 −9 −1 −5
{345} 75 77 71 85 −67 −79 −77 −85 −89
{456} −4 −4 −10 6 14 2 −2 −8 −16
{567} −50 −48 −52 −44 −12 16 48 46 44
{4567} −8 −4 −10 −2 6 6 10 0 −8
{34567} −15 −15 −11 7 17 9 11 −15 −23
The first column in each row contains the voting bloc structure as a list of the blocs that
form; the numbers inside each bloc correspond to the justices in the order given in the top row.
The other cells detail the payoﬀ to each justice. The first two voting bloc structures are Split
and Nash Stable voting bloc structures. The others are not.
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